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1NEBRASKA PROBATION REVOCATION - A PRIMER1
(2007 Revision)
by Alan G. Gless*
The law of probation revocation developed rapidly over the eighteen years preceding this
article’s 1989 appearance. While its development has slowed substantially since then, it
continues to evolve. The overall field of Nebraska probation revocation remains essentially
unchanged from the way it was in 1989 when this article first appeared. The case law has neither
burgeoned dramatically nor altered the scenery in major ways, although, it has added a few
refinements. But important procedural and substantive wrinkles have appeared through 2003
statutory amendments to the steps probation officers must take in responding to probationers’
violations of the conditions of their probation sentences.2 Less important changes appear in the
county attorneys’ and trial courts’ responses.
Probation remains a sentence under which a person found guilty of a crime or adjudicated
delinquent or in need of special supervision is released subject to court imposed conditions and
subject to supervision.3 A probation sentence remains a final order for purposes of appeal.4
However, upon proof of a violation of probation, the sentencing court may revoke the "final"
probation sentence and impose a new sentence within the statutory limits or may decline to
revoke probation and modify the terms of the probation sentence as originally imposed.5
Probation revocation proceedings occupy a procedural class of their own with elements of both
criminal and civil procedure. Even though probation revocation cannot occur without a
precedent criminal proceeding and even though a new sentencing proceeding following a
probation revocation is considered a critical stage of the precedent criminal case, the probation
revocation proceeding itself is not considered to be a stage of the precedent criminal case.
The basic rules governing probation revocations in Nebraska were developed by the
Nebraska Legislature, the United States Supreme Court, the United States Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals, and the Nebraska Supreme Court, each body acting independently, as is the nature of
our system, and sometimes adopting inconsistent approaches. The roles played by the United
States Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have faded substantially since
1989.6 But the Nebraska Court of Appeals, which came into existence only in 1992, now plays a
major role. In 1989 there was no other single reference work for discovering the esoteric rules
relating to probation revocation in the state courts of Nebraska nor is there one in 2007.
Hopefully, this article filled that void over the last eighteen years and will do so again for a
reasonable length of time.
Probation revocation is a narrow, specialized type of proceeding. Defense counsel are
frequently thrust into probation revocation defense by court appointment. The area does not
generate a great deal of fee activity. The income incentive for most lawyers to devote the
necessary time to finding and synthesizing the law of probation revocation is not high. Yet, most
alleged probation violators face imprisonment on revocation. The stakes are high for them.
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Actual probation violators are people who generally have put themselves on the fast track to
correctional facilities. Once there, they have nothing to lose by filing liability claims against
their former defense counsel.
Following the constitutional Morrissey-Gagnon rules and Nebraska statutes is not
optional and the failure to do so can affect negatively both any revocation proceedings and later
criminal proceedings as well, as State v. Pawling7 demonstrates. The purpose of this article is to
provide to the bench, bar and probation officers a probation revocation primer with the dual
goals of improving the quality of probation revocation representation (on both sides), as well as
the quality of judicial probation revocation procedures and decision making, and offering a
convenient basic reference on the law of probation revocation in Nebraska courts. This revised
article will discuss the statutory framework for probation revocation actions as it existed in 1989
and as it exists now, the pre-1971 Nebraska case law, the revolution in probation revocation law
resulting from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,8 and the post-
Gagnon decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Nebraska Supreme Court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals. This article examines
developments relating to each component of the probation revocation process.
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Few appellate cases have been decided since the 2003 amendments in revocation
procedure and none of them have dealt with the changes in probation officers’ responses to
probationers’ violations. As a result, the pre-2003 statutory framework remains an essential
component of the overall picture. Overwhelmingly, the presently existing body of Nebraska case
law relates to the pre-2003 statutory framework, but still provides critical appellate court
guidance in applying the post-2003 statutory procedures. Thus, probation revocation actors,
especially probation officers, must know and understand the way it was pre-2003 along with the
way it is post-2003.
The legislature adopted the Nebraska Probation Administration Act9 creating the state-
wide probation system and the statutory framework for probation and probation revocation in
1971. The part of the Act dealing with probation and probation revocation was based on the
ABA Standards Relating to Criminal Justice, Probation, adopted by the ABA in 1970.10 Under
the Act, probation became a sentence in itself.11 There had been no prior Nebraska statutory rules
relating to probation revocation. The Probation Act predated the decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli
by two years. The Nebraska Legislature was ahead of the U.S. Supreme Court, but it did not
foresee the detailed rules the Court would adopt. By comparison with the present rules, the Act
was not comprehensive even though it was state of the art in 1971.
Under the 1971 Act, probation officers were given considerable discretion when they
become aware that one of their probationers had violated a condition of probation. If a probation
officer had reasonable cause12 to believe a probationer had violated or was about to violate a
condition of probation and that the probationer would neither attempt to flee the jurisdiction nor
place lives or property in danger, the probation officer was required to file a violation report with
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the sentencing court with a copy to the county attorney of the county in which probation was
imposed. The court then, on the basis of the report or on such additional investigation as the
court deemed necessary, (1) suspended any further proceedings, (2) instructed the probation
officer to handle the violation informally without instituting formal revocation proceedings, or,
(3) referred the violation to the county attorney for appropriate action.13
If a probation officer had reasonable cause to believe a probationer had violated or was
about to violate a probation condition and that the probationer would attempt to flee the
jurisdiction or would endanger lives or property, then the probation officer was required to arrest
the probationer without a warrant.14 Immediately after an arrest and detention of a probationer,
the probation officer was required to notify the county attorney of the proper county and submit a
written report of the reason for the arrest. The county attorney then had discretion to either order
the probationer's release or to file with the sentencing court either a motion or information to
revoke probation.15
The legislature amended the Act in 2003 in a manner that enhanced the ability of
probation officers to deal with offender non-compliance without court involvement and
simultaneously increasing yet restricting within objective limits probation officers’ supervisory
discretion. The 2003 amendments directly altered the approach to responses to probationers’
violations of probation. A classification of types of probation violations now determines the
probation officers’ permissible or required response range. We now have a class of probation
violations denominated non-criminal violations and a class denominated substance abuse
violations.
The class of non-criminal violations includes those probationer's activities or behaviors
which create the opportunity for re-offending or diminish the effectiveness of probation
supervision resulting in a violation of an original condition of probation, and specifically include
moving traffic violations; failure to report to his or her probation officer; leaving the jurisdiction
of the court or leaving the state without the permission of the court or his or her probation
officer; failure to work regularly or attend training or school; failure to notify his or her probation
officer of changes of address or employment; frequenting places where controlled substances are
illegally sold, used, distributed, or administered; failure to perform community service as
directed; and, failure to pay fines, court costs, restitution, or any fees imposed.16
The absence of a definition of moving traffic violations as meant in § 29-2266(1)(b)(i)
leaves a gaping potential loophole for arguments. Is operating a motor vehicle without proof of
insurance or financial responsibility only a moving traffic violation, or, is it a Class II
misdemeanor? Is a DUI only a moving traffic violation, or, is it anywhere from a Class W
misdemeanor to a felony? What about operating a motor vehicle in an effort to avoid arrest,
either a Class I misdemeanor or a felony? Then of course, there’s motor vehicle manslaughter? A
Lexis search for “moving+traffic+violation” produced only three hits: the refusal to submit to
preliminary breath test statute,17 the refusal to submit to chemical test statute,18 and § 29-2266,
none of which define the term, nor, apparently, does any other Nebraska statute. The statutes do
define traffic infraction as the violation of any provision of the Nebraska Rules of the Road or of
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any law, ordinance, order, rule, or regulation regulating traffic which is not otherwise declared
to be a misdemeanor or a felony.19 Thus, we have yet another legislative invitation to exercise
interstitial judicial law making lying before us.
The class, substance abuse violation, describes those probationer's activities or behaviors
associated with the use of chemical substances or related treatment services resulting in a
violation of an original condition of probation and specifically includes a positive breath test for
the consumption of alcohol, if the offender is required to refrain from alcohol consumption; a
positive urinalysis for the illegal use of drugs; failure to report for alcohol testing or drug testing;
and, failure to appear for or complete substance abuse or mental health treatment evaluations or
inpatient or outpatient treatment.
A probation officer who develops reasonable cause to believe that a probationer has
committed or is about to commit a substance abuse violation or noncriminal violation while on
probation, but that the probationer will not attempt to leave the jurisdiction and will not place
lives or property in danger, has a range of two alternative responses. Under § 29-2266 (2)(a), the
probation officer may impose one or more administrative sanctions with the approval of his or
her chief probation officer or such chief's designee.20 If the probation officer and superior decide
to impose administrative sanctions, then, the statute provides the probationer shall acknowledge
in writing the nature of the violation and agree upon the administrative sanction. But, the
probationer has the right to decline to acknowledge the violation; and if he or she declines to
acknowledge the violation, then, the probation officer shall pursue the second alternative:21
submit a written report to the sentencing court, with a copy to the county attorney of the county
where probation was imposed, outlining the nature of the probation violation and request that
formal revocation proceedings be instituted against the probationer.22 The report filed with the
sentencing court no longer requires that the court decide whether action of some sort should be
taken; it’s only an informational filing now. Under either alternative, the probation officer must
submit a copy of the report to the county attorney of the county where probation was imposed.23
Under § 29-2266(1)(a), the administrative sanctions a probation officer who develops
reasonable cause to believe that a probationer has committed or is about to commit a substance
abuse violation or noncriminal violation while on probation, but that the probationer will not
attempt to leave the jurisdiction and will not place lives or property in danger, means additional
probation requirements imposed upon a probationer by his or her probation officer, with the full
knowledge and consent of the probationer, designed to hold the probationer accountable for
substance abuse or noncriminal violations of conditions of probation. Those additional
requirements may include: counseling or reprimand by the probation officer; increased
supervision contact requirements; increased substance abuse testing; referral for substance abuse
or mental health evaluation or other specialized assessment, counseling, or treatment; imposition
of a designated curfew for a period not to exceed thirty days; community service for a specified
number of hours under the community service statutes;24 travel restrictions to stay within his or
her county of residence or employment unless otherwise permitted by the supervising probation
officer; and, restructuring court-imposed financial obligations to mitigate their effect on the
probationer.
5
While this list of rather interesting delegated judicial power to a non-judicial state
officer has not been tested in the courts, at least, not at the appellate levels, the supreme court’s
approval of probation system policies is required. A good set of observations support the
delegation of administrative sanction powers to probation officers. Just as with the exercise of
parental powers, the nearly immediate, or at least very prompt, imposition of sanctions for minor
unacceptable behaviors possesses value all by itself. The delays inherent in judicial imposition of
sanctions for probationers’ minor misbehaviors substantially reduce the value of the sanctions.
Timeliness holds the key. Further, with this increase in probation officers’ supervisory power
probationers can no longer reduce the value of their supervision as easily. Some of the value of
supervision inheres in the ability to impose swift and certain consequences for minor
misbehaviors. Running every violation through the court system for judicial imposition of
sanctions loses the opportunity for swift and effective reinforcement of law-abiding behavior and
effective reinforcement of the courts’ goal of behavior modification through probation
sentencing. As long as probation officers remain part of the judicial system itself, probation
officers act as an arm of the court at the point in the probation process where it matters the most
for many probation violators, a place where judges cannot go.
The 2003 legislation also gave the state probation system administrator the authority to
adopt rules for the implementation of the new classification-based violation response approach.25
The administrator has done so.26 The administrator’s policy on offender non-compliance
responses adopts an objective, evidence-based matrix system probation officers must use in
determining the level of response to apply in any given case. In that system, the severity level
assigned to any given type of non-compliance factors into the eventual response plan, making the
definition of moving traffic violations discussed above that much more important to appropriate
application of the new approach to offender non-compliance. The administrator assigned the
commission of traffic infractions, not moving traffic violations, a low level of severity position.
The administrator’s choice of traffic infractions fits into the existing statutory scheme so as to
exclude misdemeanor and felony offenses from treatment as low severity offender non-
compliance. Perhaps the administrator has saved us from the legislature in this instance.
A probation officer who develops reasonable cause to believe that a probationer has
violated or is about to violate a condition of probation other than a substance abuse violation or
noncriminal violation and that the probationer will not attempt to leave the jurisdiction and will
not place lives or property in danger shall submit a written report to the sentencing court, with a
copy to the county attorney of the county where probation was imposed, outlining the nature of
the probation violation.27 For emphasis, I repeat, the report filed with the sentencing court no
longer requires that the court decide whether action of some sort should be taken; it’s only an
informational filing now.
A probation officer who develops reasonable cause to believe that a probationer has
violated or is about to violate a condition of his or her probation and that the probationer will
attempt to leave the jurisdiction or will place lives or property in danger, shall arrest the
probationer without a warrant and may call on any peace officer for assistance. Whenever a
probationer is arrested, with or without a warrant, he or she shall be detained in a jail or other
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detention facility.28 Immediately after arrest and detention pursuant to § 29-2266 (4), the
probation officer must notify the county attorney of the county where probation was imposed and
submit a written report of the reason for such arrest and of any violation of probation. The
decision making then falls to the county attorney, who, after prompt consideration of such a
written report, must either, order the probationer's release from confinement, or, file with the
sentencing court a motion or information to revoke the probation.29
Initially, when these 2003 provisions took effect, at least some county attorneys worried
about the propriety of a county attorney deciding whether an alleged probation violator should be
released or should become the subject of revocation proceedings. Apparently, they didn’t realize
the Act has contained those powers since 1971. But, even though no court at the appellate levels
has spoken yet on the propriety of that delegation of power to county attorneys, one reasonably
can posit those decisions resemble the county attorneys’ initial charging decisions sufficiently as
to pose no problem. Further, the change in the locus of that decision making authority also
removed the courts from their earlier sticky spot right in the middle of prosecutorial decision
making.
The 2003 amendments also reposed an overriding discretion in county attorneys. Recall,
even when dealing with non-criminal and substance abuse violations handled by the
administrative sanction approach, the probation officer must report the violation to the
appropriate county attorney.30 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(6) (Lexis 2007), provides that
whenever a county attorney receives a report from a probation officer that a probationer has
violated a condition of probation, the county attorney may file a motion or information to revoke
probation.
Assume a county attorney files a motion to revoke. There was, and still is, except in
juvenile cases, no statutory requirement that a preliminary hearing be accorded to persons
accused of probation violations. However, the Act did and does require a prompt consideration
of the alleged violations by the sentencing court whenever a county attorney files a motion or
information to revoke.31 The sentencing court may not revoke probation nor increase the
requirements imposed on the probationer unless a violation is proved by clear and convincing
evidence at a hearing preceded by proper notice.32 Prior to the hearing the accused probationer is
entitled to receive a copy of the motion or information or written notice of the grounds on which
the motion or information is based prior to the hearing. At the hearing, the adult probationer has
the statutory rights: to hear and controvert the adverse evidence, to offer defense evidence, and to
be represented by counsel.33
If the court finds a violation of probation has been committed, it has several dispositional
options open to it. The court may revoke probation and impose a new sentence within the range
permitted on the underlying conviction. If the court finds a violation has been committed, but
believes revocation would be inappropriate, then the court may reprimand and warn the
probationer or order intensified supervision and reporting or impose additional probation
conditions or extend the term of the probation or any combination of these options.34 If the court
believes revocation is warranted, then, the court must impose a new sentence.
7The Probation Act, even after the 2003 amendments, does not deal with a number of
issues, some of which have been resolved by case law decided after the Act was adopted or by
later statutes and some of which can be resolved only by analogizing from law governing other
matters because the appellate courts have not had the opportunity to teach us what to do. The Act
does not address preliminary hearings, rights advisories, confrontation and cross-examination,
appointed counsel for indigents, appeals, or applicability of the rules of evidence, but all of these
areas have been clarified by subsequent case law, or, with respect to evidence, by the Nebraska
Evidence Rules35 and case law. At least two other areas not addressed in the Act still have not
been clarified by later judicial or legislative action: probation violation arrest warrants and the
granting or denial of bail to alleged probation violators in custody.
Warrantless arrests of alleged probation violators by their probation officers have not
been the normal practice with lower risk traditional supervision probationers nor in less populous
rural areas. However, with the increased use of probation sentencing of higher risk probationers
resulting from the development of intensive supervision probation and community corrections,
warrantless arrests of alleged violators have been increasing. The same phenomenon has become
true in more populous areas.36
Usually, in the lower risk traditional supervision arena, probation officers file
informational violation reports with the sentencing courts, county attorneys file motions to
revoke and the courts set appearance dates on the motions to revoke and someone, prosecutors or
courts, send notices or orders to appear to the alleged violators. Most alleged violators appear
voluntarily in response to the notice to appear. But some fail to appear after notice. Some do not
receive the notices or orders to appear. Some have absconded (which is usually one of the bases
for the violation reports in their cases) prior to the issuance of the notice or order to appear.
Some flee after notice. Obtaining the appearance of uncooperative alleged probation violators
poses at least a conceptual problem. The usual device is the issuance of arrest warrants. But,
upon what authority are arrest warrants issued in such cases?
The only reference in the Act to arrest with a warrant appears in the statutory provision:
"Whenever a probationer is arrested, with or without a warrant, [the arrested probationer] shall
be detained in a jail or other detention facility."37 The statute implies that probation violation
arrest warrants may be issued, but nowhere in the Probation Administration Act does a clear
provision authorizing arrest warrants or defining the bases for their issuance appear. The statutes
specifically dealing with the issuance of arrest warrants do not mention warrants for alleged
probation violations either.38 No direct statutory provision exists authorizing the issuance of
probation violation arrest warrants by courts. The State Parole Administrator may issue arrest
warrants for alleged parole or probation violators when instructed to do so by the Parole Board or
a district judge.39 However, a number of points can be argued to legitimate the issuance of
probation violation arrest warrants.
Probation officers have the authority to arrest without warrant any probationer the officer
has reasonable cause to believe has violated or is about to violate probation and will attempt to
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flee or will endanger lives or property. Probation officers must have arrest powers to assure the
public that its interest in community safety is pursued after judgment as well as before judgment.
As long as probation officers remain members of the judicial branch, they appropriately can be
seen as state officers acting as an arm of the courts in ensuring public safety by implementing the
decisions of the courts. If a non-law enforcement, state officer, that is, a probation officer, has
warrantless arrest authority, a sentencing court logically should have authority to issue arrest
warrants on at least the same grounds. This point is buttressed by the indirect statutory reference
to warrants noted earlier and is buttressed even further in the probation system policies manual.
As part of the response to offender non-compliance rules, the administrator adopted a set
of procedures relating to probation officer warrantless arrests.40 The procedures obviously were
designed to comply with the United States Supreme Court’s post-warrantless-arrest-prompt-
probable-cause-determination decision, County of Riverside, California v. McLaughlin,41 which,
strictly speaking applied only to new offense arrests, not to probation violation arrests. The
administrator probably acted in this area out of an abundance of caution. The step between the
two arrest contexts seems fairly easy for a court to make. A warrantless arrest followed by
continued detention remains a warrantless arrest followed by continued detention regardless of
whether it was for a new offense or for a probation violation.
Riverside42 dealt with warrantless arrests followed by detentions of varying lengths
before the arrestees were brought before examining magistrates for probable cause
determinations. The key here lies in the warrantless arrests. Warrantless arrests necessarily occur
without preceding judicial determinations of probable cause.
In Riverside, the United States Supreme Court imposed a presumptively permissible 48
hour time limit for the prosecution to seek and obtain judicial determinations of the existence of
probable cause to justify the warrantless arrests and ensuing detentions, with room to seek
approval of extraordinary causes for delay beyond the 48 hour presumptively permissible period
(weekends and court holidays not included as acceptable extraordinary causes), with the post-48
hour burden of proof placed upon the prosecution. Riverside imposed no 48 hour time limit from
warrantless felony arrests to arraignments, despite some language to that effect in various
writings.43
Riverside did not even impose a 48 hour time limit from warrantless arrests to any kind of
in-court hearings, despite some language to that effect in various other writings. Riverside
simply defined “prompt” when applied to post-arrest judicial determinations of probable cause to
justify warrantless arrests and ensuing detentions as required by Riverside’s antecedent, Gerstein
v. Pugh.
The core problem resolved by Riverside and Gerstein lay in the practice of arresting
people without pre-arrest judicial determinations of probable cause followed by the failure to
make post-arrest determinations of probable cause “promptly” after the arrests. The pre-arrest
judicial determinations of probable cause made before issuance of arrest warrants removes that
core problem before it ever arises. The Court sought to provide a prompt post-arrest equivalent
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of a pre-arrest determination of probable cause, nothing more.
The Ninth Circuit, geographically the source of Riverside, has provided some
clarification in this area. In United States v. Van Poyck,44 a federal bank robbery case in which
the defendant was arrested on a Friday afternoon by state police on a federal arrest warrant and
held over the weekend before making an initial appearance on the following Monday morning in
the federal magistrate’s court, Van Poyck made incriminating statements on the way to the
appearance and then sought suppression of those statements claiming the weekend was an
unreasonable delay.
The court of appeals provided this guidance:
Other Circuits have explicitly found weekend delays reasonable when due to the
unavailability of a magistrate. See United States v. Mendoza, 473 F.2d 697, 702
(5th Cir.1973) (finding delay between Saturday morning arrest and Monday
morning arraignment reasonable); Gregory v. United States, 364 F.2d 210, 212
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 962, 87 S.Ct. 405, 17 L.Ed.2d 307 (1966)
(finding delay between Friday night arrest and Monday morning arraignment
reasonable); United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 296, 298 (6th Cir.1965) (same).
The result reached in all these cases is dictated by the complex procedures needed
to arraign a defendant. An arraignment requires court personnel to randomly
select a judge, requires pretrial services to process the defendant, and often
requires an interpreter; this is simply not a task that can be performed in a
magistrate's living room. [FN6] (italics mine). We therefore now explicitly hold
what has been implicitly understood all along: An overnight or weekend delay in
arraignment due to the unavailability of a magistrate does not by itself render the
delay unreasonable. . . .
FN6. This distinguishes this situation from
the determination of probable cause which must be
made within 48 hours (including weekends) of a
warrantless arrest under County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 1669,
114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991). Such probable cause
determinations can be made solely on the basis of
written affidavits and do not require the services of
any personnel beyond the judicial officer. (italics
mine). Moreover, the concerns that animated the
[Riverside] decision--the special harm of detaining
a person without a prior determination of whether
detention is supported by probable cause--are not
implicated in this case because Van Poyck was
arrested pursuant to a warrant. (italics mine).45
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Developing procedures to satisfy the Gerstein-Riverside doctrines in the probation violation
context provided a way to avoid problems before they arise.
Returning to the problem of a source for the issuance of probation violation arrest
warrants, if an alleged probation violator with notice fails to appear for revocation proceedings,
the violator potentially has also committed a criminal contempt by the failure to appear.46
Criminal contempt is punishable by fine, imprisonment or both.47 Criminal contempt, therefore,
constitutes an offense as defined by the Nebraska Criminal Code.48 County and district judges
and clerk magistrates have the power to issue warrants for the arrest of any person charged with
a criminal offense49 and have a duty to issue a warrant upon the filing of a complaint “charging
the commission of an offense against the laws of this state” supported by a showing of probable
cause to believe the offense charged has been committed.50 This point does not apply with equal
force to alleged probation violators without notice or with respect to whom notice or the lack of
notice cannot be shown.
However, uncooperative alleged probation violators, convicts by definition, cannot be
allowed to thwart the orderly administration of justice by their failure to appear for revocation
proceedings. Thus, authority for the issuance of probation violation warrants (especially if based
on contempt) can be supported by an interesting mixture of inherent authority,51 extrapolation
from the indirect statutory reference to warrants, plus the warrantless authority of probation
officers, creative use of the definition of “offense” under the criminal code, and the probation
system’s policies manual. Obviously, a direct, clear legislative grant of authority to issue
probation violation arrest warrants would be desirable.52
The authority to grant bail to arrested alleged probation violators has even less support
than the authority to issue warrants. The constitutional provisions relating to bail do not apply to
alleged probation violations.53 There is no statutory authority for release on bail. The bail
statutes deal with prejudgment release54 and release on bail pending appeal.55 The Nebraska
Supreme Court and Nebraska Court of Appeals have not been presented with a case raising the
issue of a trial court's authority to release an alleged probation violator on bail pending
revocation proceedings. However, the supreme court has decided a case dealing with release on
bail pending appeal in a habeas corpus action challenging extradition.56 In the Jensen case, the
court said:
Modern notions of due process and fundamental fairness demand that a citizen
should not arbitrarily be denied bail solely because there is no statute specifically
authorizing the granting of bail... The inherent power of a court may be exercised
as to bail although it is not specifically vested by statute.57
Thus, by analogy, alleged probation violators can be released on bail based upon the inherent
power of the court.58
The 1971 Act was adopted before the United States Supreme Court revamped probation
revocation law at the constitutional level. The Nebraska Legislature's attempt to regulate the
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field by adopting the Act represented the state of the art of the day.59 The Nebraska
Legislature still has not amended the Act to reflect later judicial developments for the most
part,60 but it need not, since constitutional rules apply no matter what the state’s statutes might
say. The Nebraska Legislature's power in the area of probation revocation has been sharply
curtailed by the United States Supreme Court's adoption of a constitutional blueprint for
probation revocation proceedings. The Court effectively has preempted the field.
THE GAGNON REVOLUTION61
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court adopted the rule that probation revocation
proceedings under the federal probation statutes only needed to be conducted fairly. Notice of
specific charges of probation violations was not required. Evidentiary hearings were not
necessary. Summary revocation hearings were sufficient.62 However, by 1973, the Court's
concepts of fairness in all procedural matters had gone through an almost amazing
metamorphosis, the nature of which is well known to constitutional scholars. It should have
been predictable that the Court would transport its general fundamental fairness due process
analysis into the area of probation revocation if someone asked it to do so. The Court did just
that in Gagnon v. Scarpelli.63 In order to appreciate fully the effect of Gagnon in Nebraska, a
quick look at the state of pre-Gagnon, judicially developed Nebraska probation revocation rules
is useful. In addition, the Court took some clear, pre-Gagnon steps in the direction of
revolutionizing the law of probation revocation that merit brief examination.
The Nebraska Supreme Court had developed a set of procedural rules relating to
probation revocation long before the Gagnon decision was announced. The granting and the
revocation of probation were matters left to the discretion of the trial courts. The procedures to
follow were also left to the discretion of the trial courts.64 As late as 1967, the Nebraska
Supreme Court took the position:
It is sufficient if it appears that probationer was afforded a fair and impartial
hearing, that reasonable grounds for revocation of probation existed, and that
there was not an abuse of the discretionary powers vested in the court.65
Further, an indigent Nebraska probationer was not entitled to appointed counsel for revocation
proceedings. The right of a probationer to even an informal hearing was considered a matter of
statutory right only. The court saw no constitutional right to revocation hearings.66 The court
accepted the characterization of probation as an act of grace controlled by the old right/privilege
distinction.67 From that viewpoint, the probationer's interest in continued conditional liberty was
irrelevant.
The Nebraska Supreme Court announced its decision in State v. Holiday68 on November
3, 1967. Ten days later, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in Mempa v.
Rhay and Walkling v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles.69 Mempa and
Walkling were each convicted of felonies and placed on probation with sentencing deferred.
Each was subjected to later revocation proceedings and sentenced. Mempa had been represented
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by appointed counsel when his initial guilty plea was accepted. Walkling had retained counsel
when he tendered his guilty plea. However, at the revocation and sentencing, Mempa was not
represented. The trial court did not inquire of Mempa about whether he desired appointed
counsel nor about the attorney appointed for him earlier. Walkling appeared at the revocation
without his attorney, whom he claimed to have retained for the revocation, but who did not
appear. The trial court went ahead anyway, revoked Walkling's probation and sentenced him.
The record did not show whether Walkling requested appointed counsel, but had he requested
appointed counsel, the request would have been denied. The Court noted its earlier decisions
stood for the proposition that counsel must be appointed for indigents at every stage of criminal
proceedings at which substantial rights of the criminally accused may be affected. Sentencing is
such a stage. The Court then held that whether the proceedings involved were called probation
revocations or sentencings, counsel must be afforded.70
Back in Nebraska, counsel in the Holiday case moved for rehearing. The Nebraska
Supreme Court issued its supplemental opinion on December 29, 1967.71 The court withdrew the
part of its Holiday I decision that was in conflict with Mempa and held that Holiday's request for
appointed counsel for his revocation proceeding should have been granted. In effect, the court
held indigent alleged probation violators are entitled to appointed counsel for revocation
proceedings. The court did not limit its holding to cases in which sentence had not been
pronounced before the imposition of probation. Of course, at that time, Nebraska courts did not
impose sentence before placing defendants on probation.72 The Holiday II holding, therefore, is
limited to that circumstance. But, logically, Holiday II should apply under the present system
also. A revocation of probation under the present system should result in the imposition of a new
sentence as a matter of course.
Questions relating to the sufficiency of the pleadings also were resolved before the
federal intrusion into state probation revocation proceedings. With respect to the precision of the
charging document used to initiate a probation revocation proceeding, the court held that
technical formality and precision of the charge are not prerequisites to "judicial investigation of
whether . . . defendant has observed the conditions of his probation."73 However, the probationer
is entitled to a statement of the facts revealing a violation of probation.74
In State v. Ward,75 the probationer claimed the charging document was insufficient to
invoke the court's jurisdiction because the information did not show on its face the alleged
violation occurred during the probation term. The court noted the information described the
conduct constituting the alleged violation and held it was sufficient despite the technical
deficiency. Further, in Young v. State,76 the court held it was not error to fail to list the state's
witnesses on the probation violation charging document.
The Nebraska Supreme Court also established the identity of the substantive issues
involved in probation revocations before the revolution. In Young, the court identified the two
questions presented at revocation proceedings.
First, --is there probative evidence 'showing a violation of probationary
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conditions'? If not, then that disposes of the matter . . . If there is a finding of a
violation of the probationary order, then the second question arises . . . shall
probation be continued.77
It is interesting to note the court posited the second question as whether the probation shall be
continued as opposed to the more negative question of whether probation shall be revoked.
Whether the court meant anything should be inferred from its choice of language remains
unknown and unknowable.
The definition of the ultimate issues presented in revocation proceedings establishes the
nature of the evidence admissible at revocation hearings. That is, any evidence relevant to either
ultimate issue should generally be admissible even if not relevant to both ultimate issues.78 The
statutory rules of evidence do not apply to probation revocation proceedings,79 but there must be
some limit to what courts must and can listen to in revocation hearings. Relevance is a
reasonable limiting device and can be applied as a matter of inherent power. Of course, due
process must be afforded at revocation hearings. To that end, the rules of evidence can be used as
a guide in determining the type of evidence that satisfies due process requirements.80
The combination of the Probation Act of 1971 and the Nebraska case law already
discussed forms the background for examining the revolutionary federal intrusion into state
probation revocation procedures that came in 1973. As noted earlier, the Mempa decision was
the first shot in the revolution. The Court did not jump directly from Mempa into probation
revocation. It tackled state parole revocation procedure first. In Morrissey v. Brewer,81 both the
parolees involved were arrested and returned to the Iowa penitentiary at the request of their
parole officers without a hearing before the re-commitments. If they were given hearings at all,
the hearings were held at least a month after the arrests. In Morrissey, the Court held that the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required at a minimum a system of hearings
before revocation of parole. The Court found parolees have a constitutionally protectible interest
in their continued conditional liberty. Likewise, the Court found the states have an interest in
prompt processing of parole violation matters. The Court balanced the respective interests and
arrived at the conclusion that informal proceedings would adequately protect the interests of all
concerned parties.
Noting, but apparently not appreciating, the limits on its power to create procedural rules
for state systems,82 the Court adopted a detailed set of "minimum requirements of due process,"83
including both a preliminary hearing and a formal revocation hearing. The hearings are to be
held before independent hearing officers who, constitutionally, need not be judicial officers or
lawyers.
With respect to the preliminary hearing . . . , the parolee should be given notice
that the hearing will take place and that its purpose is to determine whether there
is probable cause to believe he has committed a parole violation. The notice
should state what parole violations have been alleged. At the hearing the parolee
may appear and speak in his own behalf; he may bring letters, documents, or
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individuals who can give relevant information to the hearing officer. On request of the
parolee, [any] person who has given adverse information on which parole
revocation is to be based is to be made available for questioning in his presence.
However, if the hearing officer determines that an informant would be subjected
to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to
confrontation and cross-examination.
The hearing officer shall have the duty of making a summary, or digest, of
what occurs at the hearing in terms of the responses of the parolee and the
substance of the documents or evidence given in support of parole revocation and
of the parolee's position. Based on the information before him, the officer should
determine whether there is probable cause to hold the parolee for . . . revocation.84
The Court did not indicate whether the preliminary hearing would be a minimum
requirement in all cases nor whether it could be waived nor whether it was intended to be a
requirement only when the accused parolee was taken into custody. However, the Court did
indicate that, with respect to the final hearing, the hearing only needed to be accorded to parolees
who wanted a final hearing.85 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that a preliminary hearing
can be waived. Whether an express waiver is required, or whether the failure to request a
preliminary hearing operates as a waiver, remains undecided in the Court's decisions.
The purpose of the final hearing is to determine any contested factual issues and to
consider "whether the facts as determined warrant revocation."86 At the final hearing, accused
parolees must be given an opportunity to be heard and to show, if possible, that they have not
violated their paroles, or, if they have, that mitigating circumstances suggest the violations do not
warrant revocation. Further, the final hearing must be offered within a reasonable time after an
accused parolee is taken into custody. The Court said a lapse of two months "would not appear
to be unreasonable."87
With respect to the final hearing, the minimum requirements of due process include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations . . . (b) disclosure to the parolee of
evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present
witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not
allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a
traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or
lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on
and reasons for revoking parole.88
Despite the detailed statement of the minimum requirements, the Court emphasized its
position that the final hearing should not be equated with a criminal trial. The procedure should
be flexible enough to admit evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would
be inadmissible in a criminal trial.89 Morrissey revolutionized the law of parole revocation.
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One year later, Gagnon v. Scarpelli90 revolutionized the law of probation revocation.
Scarpelli pleaded guilty to a charge of robbery and was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.
However, execution of the sentence was suspended and Scarpelli was placed on probation. Two
months later, in another state under interstate compact supervision, he was caught in the act of
committing a burglary. The agency having jurisdiction over Scarpelli, the Wisconsin
Department of Public Welfare, revoked Scarpelli's probation without a hearing and without
counsel.91 The Court characterized probation revocation as not a part of a criminal prosecution,
but noted that it can result in a loss of liberty. As a result, due process is required in probation
revocation proceedings. The Court adopted the Morrissey rules for probation revocation cases
without even restating or rewording the rules to fit the different context.
In Gagnon, the Court also chose to take up the issue of whether due process requires the
appointment of counsel for requesting indigents accused of probation violations. The
constitutional right to counsel does not apply, because the proceeding is not part of the criminal
prosecution. The Court declined to adopt a bright line rule for the appointment of counsel.
Instead, the Court adopted a case by case rule.
Presumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases where,
after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer or parolee
makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not
committed the alleged violation . . . or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of
public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or
mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons
are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. In passing on a request .
. . the responsible agency also should consider, especially in doubtful cases,
whether the probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself.
In every case in which a request for counsel at a preliminary or final hearing is
refused, the grounds for refusal should be stated succinctly in the record.92
Gagnon created an incongruous, although only academic, result with respect to the right
to counsel. In cases in which a re-sentencing follows upon probation revocation, an indigent
defendant could be denied appointed counsel at the revocation proceeding, but would be entitled
under Mempa93 to appointed counsel for the re-sentencing. The re-sentencing could not occur
without the revocation. The revocation proceeding logically should be, but is not, considered a
critical stage of the proceedings because of the fiction that probation revocation proceedings are
not part of the underlying criminal case. The Nebraska Supreme Court may have resolved the
incongruity in Holiday II for Nebraska revocations, if Holiday II is read expansively, as it should
be.
Both Morrissey and Gagnon were appeals from revocations conducted by administrative
agencies, not by courts. Mempa was an appeal from a revocation by a court. Strictly speaking,
Gagnon should not apply in Nebraska. If held to apply, as it has been,94 there is justification to
support the proposition that Gagnon can be distinguished. It should also be remembered that
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Gagnon sets the constitutional floor below which the states may not go. The states remain
free to adopt higher independent standards. The Nebraska Supreme Court has adopted some
higher independent standards which will be explored below.
The adoption of a new legal doctrine normally generates a new wave of further litigation
exploring all facets of the new doctrine, creating refinements, clarifications, and further
explication. The adoption of the Morrissey-Gagnon rules has been no exception to the normal
course. The United States Supreme Court, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Nebraska Supreme
Court and the Nebraska Court of Appeals have all been called upon to develop the Morrissey-
Gagnon doctrine and have done so. Those areas of the doctrine that have been developed further
remain to be examined. The remainder of this article will be directed to that end. The doctrine
will be broken into such components as have been developed further and examined separately.
THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
Nature of the Hearing
The label "preliminary hearing," as used in criminal procedure, describes a number of
different types of hearings. There are: preliminary hearings required by Gerstein v. Pugh95
dealing with pretrial detentions; preliminary hearings held to determine whether felony
defendants should be held for trial; and, preliminary hearings in probation revocation
proceedings, to list only three types of preliminary hearings. It is important for all participants to
have a clear conceptual grasp of the type of preliminary hearing involved in probation
revocations. A good way to attain conceptual clarity is to contrast the Gerstein preliminary
hearing with the Gagnon preliminary hearing.
In Gerstein, the Court did just that. Gerstein dealt with the rights of persons arrested
without warrants on informations filed by the prosecutor. The decision applied only to persons
subjected to restraints on their liberty beyond the condition that they appear for trial.96 The issue
at a Gerstein hearing is whether there is probable cause for detaining the arrestee pending further
proceedings. "This issue can be determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard
is the same as that for arrest."97 The hearing is to be non-adversary.98 There is no right to
appointed counsel at the hearing because it is not a critical stage of the case.99
In contrast, the Gagnon preliminary hearing is adversarial with a limited right to counsel,
limited right to confrontation, and a right to present live testimony. Further, the Gagnon
preliminary hearing, "more than the probable cause determination required by the Fourth
Amendment, serves the purpose of gathering and preserving live testimony, since the final
revocation hearing frequently is held at some distance from the place where the violation
occurred."100
Thus, the United States Supreme Court requires more to deprive convicts of their
conditional liberty than it requires to deprive presumptively innocent accused persons of their
complete liberty in order to ease the process of discovery and perpetuation of testimony in an
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indeterminate number of cases for an indeterminate number of convicts.101 That result appears
to be more than academically incongruous, even indefensible, but the Court apparently did not
notice then and still has not noticed.
Nebraska preliminary hearings in revocation cases, at least those held in courts on the
record with counsel, share more kinship with Nebraska felony preliminary hearings than they do
with Gerstein preliminary hearings. As a result, Nebraska preliminary hearings in revocation
cases supply the opportunity for defense counsel to develop an appropriate approach to the final
hearing. Defense counsel may be able to expose weaknesses in the prosecution's case through
effective cross-examination leading to a refusal to hold the accused probationer for final hearing.
Counsel may be able to develop information for later impeachment use at the final hearing.
Favorable testimony of witnesses who may fail to appear at the final hearing can be preserved
(assuming such witnesses appear at the preliminary hearing). The essence of the prosecutor's
case can be discovered. Mitigating information may be uncovered.102 The opportunity to pursue
these possibilities can make insisting on a preliminary hearing a worthwhile effort for the
defense, especially if the alleged violation is not a new criminal conviction.
The Preliminary Hearing Requirement
Federal practice and Nebraska practice differ on the question of when a preliminary
hearing is required. The federal rule requires a preliminary hearing whenever a probationer is
held in custody on a charge of probation violation.103 The rule is based in part on the Eighth
Circuit decision in United States v. Strada.104 In Strada, the court held that preliminary hearings
are only required in cases in which the probationers are taken into custody and deprived of their
conditional freedom.105 Strada was not taken into custody until after his revocation hearing. He
appeared voluntarily.106 Likewise, the federal rule does not require a preliminary hearing for
accused probationers who appear in response to show cause orders, or who were in custody
pursuant to a new charge, or who were in custody pursuant to conviction of a later charge, or
who were arrested on the probation violation charge but obtained their release on bond or
otherwise.107 The federal rule is simple and clear. The Nebraska case law is neither simple nor
entirely clear. The Probation Act remains silent.
A basic knowledge of the Nebraska Supreme Court's rules relating to felony preliminary
hearings seems essential to understanding its decisions on the requirement of probation
revocation preliminary hearings, as well as keeping the two types of hearings conceptually
separate. The right to a preliminary hearing on felony charges is a statutory right.108 An
information charging a felony may not be filed in the district court until a preliminary hearing
has been held or waived.109 But, if a felony information is filed without a precedent preliminary
hearing, the accused must object before tendering a plea to the general issue. In the absence of a
timely objection to the failure to afford the accused a preliminary hearing, the objection is
deemed waived.110 The failure to conduct a preliminary hearing is not a jurisdictional defect.111
A felony defendant who appears with counsel and goes to trial is deemed to have waived
arraignment and to have pleaded not guilty by such conduct.112 As a corollary of the rule that a
preliminary hearing must be held or waived before the filing of a felony information, the rule is
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that any prosecutor initiated amendment in the charges filed after preliminary hearing must not
change the nature of the charges unless the accused is granted a new preliminary hearing. But no
new preliminary hearing is required if the amended charge includes some of the elements of the
original charge without the addition of any element irrelevant to the original charge.113 Finally,
even if the evidence presented at a felony preliminary hearing was not sufficient, the error is
deemed cured if the evidence presented at trial sufficed to permit a finding of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.114 The Nebraska Supreme Court has transported some, but not all, of its
felony preliminary hearing rules to the area of probation revocation preliminary hearings.
In State v. Ferree,115 during the day after the probation revocation preliminary hearing
was held, the trial court allowed the prosecution to amend its "complaint"116 to allege new and
different probation violations. Ferree appeared for the final hearing with counsel, apparently did
not request a new preliminary hearing, apparently did not object to the newly alleged violations
being heard, may or may not have denied the newly alleged violations, went to final hearing and
was found to have violated his probation as alleged. On appeal, the supreme court did not
discuss the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the final hearing.117 It did find the
"complaint" on which the preliminary hearing was held alleged a violation not supported by the
evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing.118 The supreme court reversed and remanded the
case to the district court with directions to conduct a new preliminary hearing, because the
amended "complaint" alleged violations of a different nature and identity than did the original
pleading on which the preliminary hearing had been held. The evidence adduced at the
preliminary hearing did not relate to the newly alleged violations. Therefore, the court ruled the
accused probationer had not been afforded due process.
The Ferree decision was consistent with the court's precedents relating to amended
felony charges filed after felony preliminary hearings. The Morrissey-Gagnon rules did not deal
with the factual circumstances presented in Ferree. But the Nebraska Supreme Court decided
Ferree on a combination of prior analogous state procedural rulings and due process.119 The
Ferree decision can be considered to have adopted an independent state standard, but is not
entirely clear on the point. The supreme court did not need to determine whether Ferree was
given adequate notice, but had Ferree raised the issue of notice as it related to his preliminary
hearing, it is apparent he was denied the type of notice Morrissey-Gagnon seemed to require
before preliminary hearing120 by the filing of amended allegations after preliminary hearing.
The supreme court's decision on the question of whether Ferree waived a new
preliminary hearing by not requesting one was not consistent with the court's felony preliminary
hearing precedents. Applying the rule that a waiver of important federal rights cannot be
presumed from a silent record to the question of waiver of preliminary hearing by proceeding to
final hearing with counsel without requesting a new preliminary hearing is a matter of federal
constitutional law.121 The right to a felony preliminary hearing is a state statutory right in
Nebraska. The right to a probation revocation preliminary hearing is a federal constitutional
right. The different treatment of waivers of the different types of preliminary hearing stems from
the different sources of the rights involved. Counsel should address the sources of whatever
rights they wish to advocate on their clients' behalf in probation revocations, because the
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Nebraska Supreme Court applies to probation revocations rights derived from both state law
and federal constitutional law.
It is clear following Ferree, that, in Nebraska, a probation revocation preliminary hearing
may be waived but only if the waiver is an affirmative waiver on the record.122 It seems that
preliminary hearings are required for all alleged probation violators in Nebraska, unless proper
waivers are obtained. Therefore, counsel for both parties, as well as the courts, should take care
to create a proper record of knowing, voluntary, and intelligent123 waivers of preliminary hearing
whenever alleged probation violators choose to waive preliminary hearings.124
Preliminary Hearing Venue
The Morrissey-Gagnon rules require the preliminary hearing to be held at or reasonably
near the place of the arrest.125 The Court did not say what arrest it meant,126 but it is reasonable
to assume it meant the probation violation arrest. The Court had in mind interstate supervision
cases. The ability of the accused to collect evidence would be hampered seriously if the accused
probationer could not take steps to develop the evidence until after removal to the state of the
sentencing court in the interstate context. The Court also may have been concerned that accused
probation violators would be imprisoned and remain there without bail after commencement of
revocation proceedings, a likely fact of life for many accused parole violators, but not necessarily
for many accused probation violators.127 The logistical problems faced by accused probationers
in an intrastate context are far less severe.
In Nebraska, the place of the arrest for purposes of selecting the proper preliminary
hearing venue means the place of the probation violation arrest when that arrest occurs in
Nebraska even though the violation was committed in another state. Gerson Merrill Kartman,
while on probation in Nebraska, committed a new crime in Oklahoma. Committing the new
crime was a violation of his probation. Kartman was arrested for that violation while physically
present in Nebraska. On appeal, Kartman challenged the sufficiency of the preliminary hearing.
The Nebraska Supreme Court did not specify the grounds of Kartman's challenge in its opinion.
The court simply stated it found no prejudice to Kartman "in any of the proceedings related to
the preliminary hearing."128
In its opinion in Kartman's subsequent federal habeas action, the United States District
Court discussed the challenge in detail. Among other things, Kartman claimed that since the
offense for which the state sought revocation was committed in Oklahoma, the preliminary
hearing should have been held in Oklahoma, not in Nebraska. However, since Kartman was
arrested in Nebraska on the probation violation, the federal district court held the preliminary
hearing in Nebraska was held reasonably near the place of the arrest.129 Had Kartman been
arrested for the probation violation in Oklahoma, the Morrissey-Gagnon rules would have
required that the preliminary hearing be held in Oklahoma.
Morrissey did not address specifically the situation of intrastate revocation proceedings.
Gagnon did, but made no change in the reasonably-near-the-place-of-the-arrest-or-violation
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requirement. The Nebraska Supreme Court has dealt with the proper venue for the
preliminary hearing in a case in which the probationer was arrested in a county other than the
county of the sentencing court. In State v. Ferree,130 Ferree was arrested for violation of a Holt
County District Court probation sentence in Lancaster County where he was serving a
penitentiary sentence in a separate case. He was returned to Holt County. The preliminary
hearing was held there. The supreme court found no infirmity in holding the preliminary hearing
in Holt County instead of Lancaster County, because Ferree already was incarcerated at the time
of the probation violation arrest and because all of the records relating to his probation were in
the possession of the Holt County District Court.
No cases have as yet reached the Nebraska Supreme Court in which the violator was not
arrested on the probation violation, the violation was committed in a county not the county of the
sentencing court, the preliminary hearing was held in the sentencing court's county, and the
violator challenged the preliminary hearing venue. Preliminary hearings are usually waived, so
the absence of such a case is not surprising. The Morrissey-Gagnon rules do not indicate who
should conduct the preliminary hearing when the proper venue is not in the county or even
located within the judicial district of the sentencing court. Such cases as the hypothetical
described above present difficult, or at least interesting, logistical questions in terms of the
proper agency or body to hold the preliminary hearings and their jurisdiction to do so. How does
the Lancaster County Court obtain jurisdiction over a Seward County Court probation revocation
proceeding? Even if probation supervision is transferred from Seward County to Lancaster
County, the Seward County Court’s jurisdiction over revocation proceedings is not transferred. If
an agency other than a court conducts the preliminary hearing, how does that non-judicial agency
obtain jurisdiction? Does the United States Supreme Court have the authority to grant
jurisdiction over probation revocation proceedings to agencies other than the sentencing court?
Venue and subject matter jurisdiction properly are matters for legislative determination
because of the need to deal with the sorts of logistical questions just posed. Case by case
resolution of such problems is simply not appropriate. However, the Court injected itself into
these problems by constitutionally requiring that a probation violation preliminary hearing be
held at or reasonably near the place of the arrest or violation. Despite the United States Supreme
Court's intrusion into state legislative matters on the federal constitutional level, it would seem
that the Nebraska Legislature could act on venue and subject matter jurisdiction questions, as
long as the Nebraska Legislature honors the reasonably-near constitutional rule. Further, in the
intrastate context, the decision of a state legislature on the question of what is reasonably near
ought to be entitled to respect as a determination of a coordinate branch of state government in a
federal system.
Identity of the Hearing Officer
Under the Morrissey-Gagnon rules, nearly anyone not directly involved in the case can
serve as the preliminary hearing officer. Preliminary hearing officers need not be judicial
officers nor even lawyers. The Court restrained itself in establishing a minimum rule on this
point. The Nebraska Supreme Court adhered to this part of the rules in State v. Calder.131 The
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deputy clerk of the district court heard Calder's preliminary hearing. Nothing in the record
suggested the deputy clerk was involved in anything relating to Calder or his probation nor that
she was subject to anyone's influence relating to the case. The supreme court approved of the
use of court clerks as preliminary hearing officers, as long as they are not involved in the cases
they are assigned to hear. The use of clerk magistrates as preliminary hearing officers in the
county courts should also be acceptable.132 Apart from the consideration of failing to make the
most beneficial allocation of judicial time, nothing should prevent the sentencing judges
themselves from conducting the preliminary hearings in probation revocations. The sentencing
judges themselves generally do not become involved in the supervision nor in the decision to
seek revocation nor obtain information about the cases outside of the context of their judicial
duties.133
Using a probation officer not involved in supervising the case or even the chief district
probation officer of the district in which revocation is pending as the preliminary hearing officer
does not seem sufficient to impart to the proceeding an unimpeachable aura of impartiality on the
part of the fact finder,134 especially if the hearing officer was a chief who helped make the
decision on sanctions, but would seem allowable under the present form of the Morrissey-
Gagnon rules. Whether this practice could withstand analysis at the appellate level remains to be
seen. The proper case has not reached the appellate level yet.
Preliminary Hearing Officer Reports
Under the Morrissey-Gagnon rules, the preliminary hearing officer has a duty to prepare
a summary or digest of the hearing in terms of stating the substance of the evidence supporting
revocation, the alleged violator's responses, and the alleged violator's position with respect to
revocation. In addition, the hearing officer should make a finding of the existence or non-
existence of probable cause to hold the alleged violator for final hearing. If the hearing officer
finds probable cause exists, that finding is sufficient to detain the alleged violator. Yet, formal
findings of fact and conclusions of law are not required, because the result of the preliminary
hearing is not a final determination. The Court said the utility of the written exercise lies in its
potential for reducing the risk of error.135 But, strict compliance with the hearing officer report
requirement may not be necessary in all cases.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the sufficiency of the hearing officer's
report in Kartman v. Parratt.136 The hearing officer's report did not set forth the hearing officer's
reasoning nor summarize the evidence presented nor report the responses of the probationer.
The hearing officer did make a specific finding of probable cause. The court of appeals noted
that Kartman had counsel and his preliminary hearing was recorded. A transcription of the
proceedings easily could have been obtained. The court of appeals was unable to perceive any
prejudice to Kartman from the formal deficiencies of the hearing officer's report.137
A verbatim transcription of the preliminary hearing, as a matter of common sense, obviously
would be more useful to counsel and the alleged violator than would a report summarizing the
substance of the evidence and the probationer's responses. The report would be most useful only
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in those systems where the preliminary hearing is not recorded. Where the finding is nothing
more than probable cause to require a final hearing, the utility of the hearing officer's report is
quite low, except to an appellate tribunal seeking ways to lighten its own workload. Requiring a
written report from the preliminary hearing officer as the Court did in Morrissey-Gagnon as a
matter of minimum due process does not materially assist accused probationers in systems where
the proceedings are recorded. The real benefit of the written report is a benefit to the appellate
court and to no one else. The Court at least could have been candid about its reason for requiring
a preliminary hearing officer report.
For the probationer, the truly high stakes are on the line at the final hearing, not at the
preliminary hearing. However, the supervising probation officer who made the decision to seek
revocation has high stakes on the line at the preliminary hearing stage. If the preliminary hearing
evidence fails to establish probable cause, the relationship between the supervising probation
officer and the probationer suffers a dramatic change. Effectiveness in supervision by that officer
from that point forward predictably will be diminished. The decision to seek revocation must be
made with care and based on sufficient evidence.
Further, as long as there is no change in the alleged violations after the preliminary hearing
and the evidence at the final hearing is sufficient to prove the alleged violations were committed
and that revocation is warranted, the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary hearing
logically becomes irrelevant. Nevertheless, the Court’s approach to the sufficiency of the
evidence at the preliminary hearing and the sufficiency of the preliminary hearing officer's report
provide defense counsel and probation violators with ammunition to seek reversals despite the
merits of the case made at the final hearing.138
THE FINAL HEARING
Nature of the Final Hearing
An alleged violator must be given the opportunity to have a final hearing, if the alleged
violator wants a hearing, prior to the final decision on revocation under the Morrissey-Gagnon
rules.139 The final hearing must lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and
consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation of probation. The alleged
violator must be given the opportunity to be heard and to attempt to show that no violation was
committed, or, if the probationer did commit a violation or violations, that there were sufficient
mitigating circumstances to excuse the violation/s and to militate against revocation.140 Despite
its adoption of a detailed set of procedural rules, the Court claimed it did not intend to create an
inflexible structure.141 The Court said it did not intend to equate the final revocation hearing
with a criminal prosecution.142 It did exclude from revocation hearings such tactics as attempts
to re-litigate issues determined by other fora, such as new criminal convictions. It considered the
final hearing to be a narrow inquiry.143
The nature of the questions to be determined at the final hearing requires some flexibility,
especially in the area of admissible evidence. The first question generally is a straightforward,
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retrospective question of fact: has the probationer violated one or more conditions of
probation?144 Counsel and courts habitually deal with questions of historical fact. However, the
first question can develop a certain degree of fuzziness, say, in a situation in which a
probationer’s alleged violation consists something like the purchase of an unauthorized, one-way
airline ticket which the probationer detects and prevents from becoming an unauthorized trip
outside the jurisdiction by arresting the probationer outside the airport entrance.
The second question, which conceptually only arises if a violation is proved, is a
prospective question of prediction: can this probation violator successfully continue on
probation, or, is a less rehabilitative, more punitive disposition necessary? Put even more
acutely, given this probation violator’s new misbehaviors and considering the nature of the
convicted misbehaviors resulting in the initial probation sentence, can the court continue
effectively protecting society through further rehabilitative efforts, or, has incapacitation become
a more preferable disposition? The more acute formulation recognizes the role of probation
supervision ranges far beyond mere compliance monitoring; it’s a matter of seeking criminal
behavior change.
The Morrissey-Gagnon Court couched the second question in terms of whether the
individual is able to live in society without committing antisocial acts?145 The Court's
formulation seems more applicable to felony probationers than to most misdemeanor
probationers, depending on one's meaning of the term antisocial. However, protection of society
is also a basic issue with reference to a number of misdemeanors.146 Prediction innately is a
discretionary matter, even though predictions in probation revocations must be based on facts.
In practice, the two questions can be, and probably should be, dealt with separately in any
case. Evidence relevant to both questions can be, and frequently is, presented in a single hearing.
Disposing of the matter in a single final hearing precludes obtaining pre-sentence report updates.
That limits the sentence relevant information available to the court. At any rate, counsel for both
parties should make the effort to offer evidence relevant to both questions whenever available.
The revocation court may not be inclined to revoke on proof of just any violation.
Violations Warranting Revocation
The question of what types of violations warrant revocation is not subject to a single
answer. The Nebraska Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have adopted
divergent positions on the question. In State v. Clark,147 the probationer's only proved violation
was a failure to report to the probation officer one month (he was late reporting the preceding
month). The trial court revoked Clark's probation. The supreme court affirmed, holding: "It is
clear that . . . a single violation of probation can support revocation."148
In United States v. Reed,149 the probationer failed to report repeatedly, failed to give
notice of an address change, failed to find employment, and failed to make restitution. The
district court injected the restitution issue on its own motion. The Eighth Circuit vacated the
revocation and remanded for further proceedings, noting:
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The decision to revoke probation should not merely be a reflexive reaction to an
accumulation of technical violations of the conditions imposed upon the offender .
. . Rather, probation should be revoked only in those instances in which the
offender's behavior demonstrates that he or she 'cannot be counted on to avoid
antisocial activity.' The decision to revoke [Reed's] probation was based not on
commission of a new crime or other egregiously antisocial behavior, but merely
on Reed's failure to report, to give notice of an address change, to find
employment, and to make restitution.150
If probation should not be revoked for violations like Reed's violations, one must wonder
why such conditions would be included in the probation sentence at all? The court of appeals
did not address this question in its opinion, but the inescapable inference from the court's choice
of language is that a complete lack of cooperation is not grounds for revocation. Apparently,
only a law violation or some injury to others warrants revocation in the view of the Eighth
Circuit's Reed panel.
A large number of offenders are in need of structure and stability in their lives. Their
lack of structure and stability is one of the factors leading to the lifestyle that got them sentenced
to probation. Probation sentences for such people are designed, in part, to impose structure and
stability in the hopes that the imposition will teach them the benefits of a different lifestyle.151
Conditions of probation of the sort that Reed violated are directed at that purpose, and,
additionally, at the goal of monitoring the probationer's progress or lack of progress in making
positive changes in their prior antisocial attitudes and behaviors. The Eighth Circuit Reed
panel’s view ignored this aspect of the purpose of probation sentences.
A probationer who refuses repeatedly to abide by such rehabilitative conditions may not
be amenable to rehabilitation. Such a probationer not only demonstrates an unwillingness to
make efforts toward rehabilitation, but also interferes with effective probation supervision.
Recall, effective probation supervision seeks to change criminal behavior, reduce recidivism, and
create safer communities. Courts clinging to the Reed panel’s view fail to support efforts toward
reaching the positive goals of probation sentencing and the offender community will spread that
word quickly.
But, the Eighth Circuit has not been consistent in its decisions on whether the violations
involved warranted revocation. In United States v. Smallwood,152 the probationer's failures to
report to the probation office and to report his current address, after an earlier attempt to revoke
his probation for his failures to report to the probation office and to reside with his father, were
considered sufficient violations to warrant revocation. In United States v. Goeller,153 the
probationer's failures to submit monthly report forms, to report changes of address, to participate
in a psychological evaluation, and to keep his counseling appointments were deemed sufficient
cause to revoke. In United States v. Burkhalter,154 the probationer's poor performance and poor
attendance in a required vocational training program and his failure to abide by his halfway
house's rules were deemed adequate cause to revoke his probation after only three months on
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probation. The court believed Burkhalter had shown a pervasive unwillingness to follow a
rehabilitation program, justifying revocation even though he had not endangered society by his
violations.155 However, in dictum in United States v. Rodgers,156 the court of appeals indicated
the probationer's failures to report his change of employment, change of address, and repeated
failures to report to the probation office were not sufficient violations to warrant revocation
without some form of recorded explicit consideration of lesser sanctions by the trial court.
All four of these Eighth Circuit decisions were three judge panel decisions. The panels'
composition was different in each case.157 Smallwood predated Reed, but Reed was cited by the
Burkhalter and Rodgers panels. Smallwood was cited by the Rodgers panel. Burkhalter was
cited by the Goeller panel. The Eighth Circuit has not adopted a definitive stance on what
violations warrant revocation. The inconsistency in its decisions on the point may result from a
preference for deciding each case on its unique circumstances, or, as a by-product of appellate
decision making by variable membership panels.
On a somewhat related question that I deal with later, the Nebraska Court of Appeals
clarified that a new criminal conviction, even though not yet final and even if pending on appeal,
may be used as proof that a probationer has violated the conditions of his or her probation.158
Sufficiency of Notice and Motion/Information
Fidelity to the fiction that probation revocation is not part of a criminal prosecution
requires that only minimal notice of the alleged violations must be given to alleged violators.
But the notice given must still be fair notice in order to satisfy due process. “Notice” has several
uses in legal language; here, it refers to the ability of the language used in describing the alleged
violations to tell the alleged violator how he or she allegedly violated the conditions of his or her
probation. What constitutes fair notice is the problem. Even in criminal prosecutions, charges
couched in the statutory language, which is generally not fact specific and is somewhat vague,
are sufficient if they are specific enough to enable a criminal defendant to prepare a defense and
to plead the judgment in bar. Alleged probation violations should not be required to be more
specific than criminal charges. However, an idea that a notice separate from the motion or
information to revoke is required has led to challenges, as well as the question of sufficient
specificity of the allegations. The appellate courts have taken a practical approach to such issues
so far.
In State v. Kartman,159 no issue was raised on direct appeal with respect to the sufficiency
of the notice given to Kartman. However, in the federal habeas action Kartman did attack the
sufficiency of one allegation in the information and notice. The court ruled the allegation
charging that Kartman had failed to comply with the terms of his probation and had not
demonstrated a good faith effort to rehabilitate himself was not sufficiently specific, but the error
was harmless because one of the proved allegations was specific enough.160 The court held that
where a motion to revoke includes more than one count, the vagueness of one count "could well
not render the entire proceeding unconstitutional when the other counts are sufficiently specific
and the judge's findings of fact as per the specific counts are supported by the evidence."161
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On appeal in the habeas action, Kartman claimed the notice of final hearing was
improper because he did not receive a copy of the preliminary hearing officer's report until the
day of the final hearing or other written notice of the final hearing after the preliminary hearing.
The Eighth Circuit noted that Morrissey required that written notice of the claimed violations
must be given prior to the final hearing. The notice given to Kartman was a written notice of
preliminary hearing. The court held the notice satisfied due process because the grounds for
violation remained unchanged following the preliminary hearing.162 The holding implies that
where there is a change in the alleged grounds for violation that a new notice is required to be
given to the probationer.163 While the court of appeals affirmed, it took the opportunity to note
the charge failed to apprise the probationer of the conditions of probation which he was alleged
to have violated and of the dates and events supporting the charge.164
In State v. Calder,165 the notice was deficient in not setting forth the facts alleged to
constitute violations. However, the probationer acknowledged before the district judge in open
court that he was familiar with the contents of the motion to revoke. The motion did state
sufficient facts. Further, the district judge advised the probationer at the initial appearance on the
motion to revoke of the nature of the allegations. The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that
Calder had actual notice of the allegations of the motion. Therefore, the deficiency of the notice
of preliminary hearing was not prejudicial. Analogizing to the rules relating to indictments, the
court noted that due process only requires that the accused be given sufficient notice of the
charges against him in order that he may prepare a defense.166 Service on the probationer of a
copy of the motion to revoke should be sufficient notice of the alleged violations. Restating the
allegations in a separate notice of hearing is senseless paperwork, especially when the notice of
hearing and the motion can be combined in a single document. The court did not require the use
of two pieces of paper.
In State v. Nevells,167 the information to revoke alleged that the probationer had violated
the laws of the State of Nebraska on November 4, 1968. The court characterized the allegation
as a specific charge of a violation of the paragraph of the probation that required the probationer
to be law abiding and to not violate any laws.168 The court held the allegation was sufficiently
specific. Since probation revocation proceedings are not a stage of a criminal case, only the due
process test of the sufficiency of the allegations and notices should apply. The double jeopardy
clauses of the federal and state constitutions should not apply. However, prosecutors can finesse
the issue by taking the few minutes necessary to be specific.
Confrontation and Hearsay
Alleged violators have the right at the final hearing to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation.169 Normally, disclosure of the identity of the state's witnesses and the substance
of their likely testimony would be helpful in preparing a defense. Confrontation is a criminal
trial right. The confrontation clause has been held inapplicable to normal sentencing
proceedings,170 but applicable to supplemental sex offender proceedings.171 A revocation
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hearing is not a criminal trial. Nevertheless, the Court has extended a conditional
confrontation right to probation revocation proceedings. Appellate courts have disagreed on the
nature and mechanics of the precedent finding of good cause necessary to a denial of
confrontation in probation revocation hearings.
In Kartman v. Parratt,172 the trial court denied the probationer the opportunity to review
his probation file at the preliminary hearing. The probationer was allowed to examine the file at
the final hearing. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that a probationer should normally
be given the names of persons who have provided information against the probationer and should
be granted the opportunity to confront those persons. However, if the hearing officer finds an
informant would be subjected to a risk of harm if identified, then the informant need not be
subjected to confrontation and cross-examination. The court said that Morrissey does not require
an express written finding of a risk of harm. Therefore, since there was no showing of prejudice
to the probationer at the hearing, the court refused to assume the hearing officer did not find that
a risk of harm was presented by identifying the informant at the preliminary hearing.173
A risk of harm to an informant is not the only acceptable basis for a finding of good cause
for denial of confrontation recognized by the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit has adopted a
balancing test requiring trial courts in probation revocation actions to balance the probationer's
conditional right to confront adverse witnesses against the reasons the government asserts for not
requiring confrontation. There are no fixed rules on what the government must present to
establish good cause, but the court of appeals has listed the factors to be used in evaluating the
government's basis for its requested denial of confrontation.174 First, trial courts must assess the
government's explanation for its position that confrontation is undesirable or impractical. The
examples the court gave are danger of harm to government witnesses and the expense or
difficulty of procuring the attendance of live witnesses. The second factor trial courts must
consider is the reliability of the evidence the government offers as a substitute for live testimony.
When the trial court is persuaded that the burden of producing live testimony is inordinate and
offers demonstrably reliable hearsay as a substitute, then the government has made a strong
showing of good cause. However, if the government shows neither that presenting live
testimony would be unreasonably burdensome nor offers as a substitute hearsay evidence bearing
indicia of reliability, then the probationer is entitled to confrontation.175
In United States v. Bell,176 the government sought a revocation based upon Bell's alleged
violations of state and federal laws. The revocation hearing was held in Arkansas, Bell's place of
residence at the time of the probation sentence. Some time after the sentence, Bell moved to
Kansas. While living in Kansas, Bell was arrested by the Wichita police for driving while
intoxicated, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The Wichita charges
had not been tried at the time of the revocation hearing. In addition, three urine samples taken
from Bell in Kansas under the probation order tested positive for THC, indicating Bell's use of
marijuana. Through Bell's Kansas probation officer, the government offered the Wichita police
arrest reports and the reports of the California chemical laboratory that had done the urinalyses
of Bell's samples.177 Bell objected on both hearsay and confrontation grounds. The trial court
overruled the objections. The court of appeals noted a finding of good cause is implicit in the
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decision to overrule a confrontation clause objection in probation revocation proceedings. A
remand for explicit findings of good cause was not necessary.178
The court of appeals ruled the urinalysis reports bore substantial indicia of reliability.
The reports are the regular reports of a company whose business it is to conduct such tests with
the expectation that the company's clients will act on the company's reports. There was no
evidence contradicting Bell's alleged drug use. Bell made only general, unsubstantiated claims
that the analyses may have been defective. The court of appeals found good cause existed to
permit the government to avoid the difficulty and expense of bringing the testing personnel from
California to Arkansas to testify in person.179
With respect to the Wichita police reports, the court of appeals concluded the reports are
reliable evidence that an arrest was made but are significantly less reliable evidence of the
commission of the offenses alleged. The Wichita officers could have been brought voluntarily or
by subpoena to the hearing in Arkansas, but at considerable expense. However, even though the
court made these observations, it chose not to use its balancing test, because Bell's admissions
and the detailed narrative in the reports established the reliability of the arrest reports. However,
the court carefully pointed out it was not endorsing the use of arrest reports instead of arresting
officer testimony in every revocation case.180 The court said:
Whether arrest reports are sufficiently reliable, and whether the expense and
inconvenience of producing live testimony are sufficiently great, to justify
dispensing with the right of confrontation, are questions to be faced on a case-by-
case basis considering all the relevant circumstances, including any admissions
that may have been made by the probationer or parolee.181
An interesting twist gave the court the chance to deal with oral hearsay and double
hearsay within the good cause balancing test context. Bell called his Arkansas probation officer
for the purpose of showing that probation officer had received good reports about Bell during the
time he supervised Bell's case. For the sole purpose of detracting from whatever weight the good
reports testimony might have had, the prosecutor cross-examined the probation officer on the
subject of an Arkansas state police investigation of Bell for drug trafficking. The evidence
presented in this manner was not the investigation reports, but only the probation officer's
account of his conversations with the investigating officers and with a FBI agent not personally
involved in the investigation. The court of appeals indicated it would not have disapproved had
the use of the evidence been restricted to the government's purpose in eliciting it. However, the
district court did not so confine its use of the evidence. The district court relied in part on that
evidence in its revocation decision.
That hearsay and double hearsay was the only evidence offered about any drug dealing.
With respect to that substantive use of that evidence, the court of appeals ruled it lacked
sufficient reliability and that the government had not shown any difficulty would have been
posed by calling local officers to testify in person. Therefore, for substantive use, the admission
of the oral hearsay violated Bell's conditional confrontation right.182
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In State v. Mosley,183 the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed a revocation record in which
the trial court admitted hearsay to prove the probationer's violation. The identity of the
informant was disclosed, but the informant was not produced at the final hearing. The
investigating police officer was allowed to testify at the final hearing to what the informant had
told him. The officer had no personal knowledge of anything related to the violation. The
probationer denied involvement in the violation. The court said there was no showing of
possible risk to the informant or other good cause why confrontation should not have been
granted. Further, the trial court made no determination of whether good cause had been shown.
Therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further hearing, with instructions that the right of
confrontation be allowed unless the trial court specifically finds good cause for a denial.184
Whether the supreme court would accept implicit findings of good cause is unclear.
Ten years later, in State v. Ozmun,185 the court allowed hearsay in a probation revocation.
The probation officer was allowed to testify to what he had been told by a counselor at an
alcoholism treatment center from which the probationer allegedly voluntarily absented herself
without permission and whose rules she had violated during her stay there. The probationer had
admitted her violations to the probation officer. The court noted that the Nebraska Evidence
Rules do not apply in probation revocation proceedings. Therefore, the admission of the hearsay
was not an error.
The court did not indicate in its opinion whether the probationer only objected on hearsay
grounds or whether the probationer also charged a violation of her conditional right of
confrontation. Assuming a hearsay objection also puts confrontation in issue,186 the only
difference between Ozmun and Mosley is Ozmun's admission to her probation officer. Ozmun's
extrajudicial admission to her probation officer imparted an aura of reliability to the hearsay, but
it was still oral hearsay of the type condemned in Bell. Bringing the alcohol program counselor
from Omaha to Kearney would not have entailed the difficulty involved in interstate situations.
But, again, if Ozmun's counsel did not object on confrontation grounds, the supreme court had
no reason to consider confrontation. It is counsel's obligation to raise the proper issues. The
courts should not be expected to do counsel's job.
Counsel should not rely on a hearsay objection to raise a confrontation issue in any
proceeding, but certainly not in a probation revocation hearing to which the rules of evidence do
not apply. Specific confrontation objections should be made whenever appropriate in probation
revocation proceedings to avoid the possibility of waiving the confrontation issue by failing to
interpose the proper objection. Some latitude can be allowed, but counsel should not rely on
obtaining latitude. It worked once, as we’ll see, but may not work frequently.
Cross-examination is one essential component of confrontation. In State v. Clark,187 the
transcribed proceedings showed that Clark advised the district court that his objection to the
admission of a lab report without the technician’s testimony rested upon his fundamental due
process right to cross-examine the person who conducted the chemical test. Noting “[i]t is the
duty of counsel to make his [or her] objections so specific that the court may understand the
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point intended to be raised,” the court of appeals ruled that Clark's counsel met that duty.188
But two paragraphs earlier in its opinion, the court of appeals reported that “when Clark
demanded the right to confront the lab technician or chemist, the trial court denied the motion
without making a finding of good cause.”189 So, not only did Clark’s counsel use the magic
word, “cross-examine,” in his objection to the lab report when offered through the probation
officer, but counsel also, at some point, demanded the right to confront the person who did the
analysis. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the revocation decision for further hearing
with instructions that the right of confrontation be allowed unless the trial court specifically finds
good cause shown for a denial.190 So, the admonition remains. Specific confrontation objections
should be made whenever appropriate in probation revocation proceedings to avoid the
possibility of waiving the confrontation issue by failing to interpose the proper objection. The
Clark decision cannot be pushed too far. Precedents are only as binding as their facts permit.
Self-Incrimination
The Morrissey-Gagnon rules do not include any mention of the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination. In Minnesota v. Murphy,191 the issue was whether the fifth and
fourteenth amendments prohibited the introduction into evidence at a later criminal proceeding
of admissions made by the defendant to his probation officer during a mandatory meeting with
the probation officer. The Court held the admissions could be used in the criminal trial because
they were voluntary and the defendant had not claimed his privilege when the probation officer
asked the questions, but answered the probation officer's incriminating questions instead. The
Court further held the probation officer was not required to give a Miranda rights advisory prior
to questioning the defendant. In reaching the holdings in the case, the Court included a footnote
with significance for probation revocations.
If the questions put to a probationer by the probation officer in a probation
meeting are relevant to the probationary status and pose no realistic threat of
incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding, then the privilege is inapplicable.
The fact that a truthful answer might lead to a revocation of probation does not
render the privilege applicable. A probation revocation proceeding is not a
criminal proceeding. Even though due process must be provided in a revocation
proceeding, the rights accorded to accused persons in criminal proceedings do not
apply.
Just as there is no right to a jury trial before probation may be revoked, neither is
the privilege . . . available to a probationer. It follows that whether or not the
answer to a question about [the probationary status] is compelled by the threat of
revocation, there can be no valid claim of the privilege on the ground that the
information sought can be used in revocation proceedings.192
The Court’s footnote language bears repeating: “[i]f the questions put to a probationer by
the probation officer in a probation meeting are relevant to the probationary status and pose no
realistic threat of incrimination in a separate criminal proceeding, then the privilege is
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inapplicable.” If the probation officer’s questions pose a realistic threat of incrimination in a
separate criminal proceeding, then the privilege may apply, but would be lost if the probationer
answered instead of claiming the privilege. The example the Court used was a question relating
to a residential requirement. The situation would differ if the probationer were in custody and the
probation officer asked a question that could be incriminating in a separate criminal proceeding
and the result likewise might differ.193
An alleged probation violator can be compelled to testify about the alleged violations in
the probationer's own revocation hearing over self-incrimination objections based on both the
federal and state constitutions, as long as the state does not compel the probationer to incriminate
himself or herself concerning a new or separate criminal offense. A probation revocation
hearing is not a stage of a criminal prosecution. Admitting a probation violation other than
admitting commission of a new crime does not implicate necessarily the constitutional self-
incrimination privilege, but could.194
In State v. Burow,195 the probationer challenged the revocation of her probation on the
ground that her admission was not voluntary and intelligent because the revocation court did not
advise her on the record of her privilege against compulsory self-incrimination before accepting
her admission. The supreme court noted the revocation court had advised the probationer of all
her rights under the Act. The Act does not require notice of the privilege.
The supreme court also noted the privilege, under both constitutions, applies only to
criminal cases and that probation revocation hearings are not criminal proceedings. Therefore,
"[t]he admission . . . of the facts alleged in the motion to revoke was not a criminal guilty plea,
just as the result was not a new conviction but, rather, a change in probationary status with
respect to a previous conviction."196 So, the pleas tendered in probation revocation cases are
admissions and denials, not the familiar guilty, not guilty, and no contest pleas. If the pleas in
probation revocations are not the familiar criminal pleas, the question arises as to what advice, if
any, must a revocation court give to an accused probationer?
Rights Advisory
The Blankenbaker case, disapproved in Burow, also suggested that a plea to a motion or
information charging a probation violation must be tendered voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. Whether that suggestion was disapproved is unclear. It remains unclear whether
any criminal arraignment-like colloquy must be held with probationers tendering admissions.
The United States Supreme Court and the Nebraska Supreme Court have not ruled directly on
the point. However, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in United States v. Ross,197 a
federal probation revocation, that a waiver of counsel must be knowing and intelligent and that
requires an explanation of possible consequences of a revocation hearing.
In United States v. Johns,198 the probationer admitted a probation violation through
counsel. Her probation was revoked on the admission. She contended on appeal that the
revocation court erred in not addressing her personally to determine on the record that she
32
understood what rights she was waiving on her admission through counsel. The court held
that Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 does not apply to probation revocations. The Fifth Circuit did not rule
on the applicability of Boykin v. Alabama, holding instead that the error, if any, was harmless.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that both Boykin and Rule 11 are inapplicable in
probation revocation proceedings.199
In United States v. Rapert,200 the Eighth Circuit held that neither Rule 11 nor Boykin
apply to probation revocation proceedings. As a result, a rights advisory is unnecessary.
Further, because Rapert was advised at the time he tendered his plea to the underlying criminal
charge of the possible penalties, it was not necessary to advise him again of the penalties at his
revocation proceeding. The theoretical justifications underlying Boykin do not obtain in
probation revocation proceedings. A probationer in revocation actions has no right to a jury trial,
only an attenuated right of confrontation, and only a limited self-incrimination privilege.201
Written Statement of Fact Finder
The Morrissey-Gagnon rules require the hearing officer to prepare, after the revocation
hearing, a written statement as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation
in the event of a revocation. In State v. Jaworski,202 the Nebraska Supreme Court dealt with the
need for and sufficiency of the written statement after final hearing. First, the court
distinguished both Morrissey and Gagnon as cases involving revocations by administrative
agencies, not by courts. The Supreme Court has not dealt with judicial probations and judicial
revocations as provided for in the Nebraska Probation Act in the direct appeal context. The court
also noted that the requirement of a written statement does not fit the pattern of a judicial hearing
in a court of record in which the proceedings, findings, and judgments are recorded and subject
to appellate review. The court said: "It would be strange indeed if the formal requirements of
fact finding and determination of guilt were to be more strict at a probation revocation hearing
than at an original criminal trial."203
The court also admonished trial courts:
Good practice under the . . . Act dictates that the trial court's order of its
findings, reasons, and conclusions should be reasonably detailed and precise. . . .
The trial courts should also take additional care with the written findings where
there are multiple charges of acts constituting violations of . . . probation in order
to make sure that findings are made for each specific charge. . . . In its written
findings and judgment in the record the court need only refer to the evidence in
the record.204
The court's admonition was made under Nebraska statutory law and could easily be deemed an
independent state standard supervisory rule.
In Kartman v. Parratt,205 the Eighth Circuit reviewed the revoking state judge's written
statement of evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation. The state judge had referred
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to the conduct for which revocation was sought and to the term of probation allegedly
violated. The court of appeals explained:
The purpose of the written statement is to allow the reviewing court to determine
whether there was a factual basis for revocation and to provide the probationer
with a record of the proceeding so as to protect him from a second revocation
proceeding based on the same conduct.206
Viewed in that light, the question was still a close one, but, even though meager, the
revoking court's findings were sufficient for appellate review. Whether the findings were
sufficient for the probationer's protective record was not addressed, leading to the inference that
the court of appeals was not especially concerned about that use of the record. Further, the court
did not indicate any basis for the idea that a probationer is entitled to a record for double-
jeopardy-like defense purposes; double jeopardy does not apply to probation revocation actions.
After Kartman it did not appear the Eighth Circuit would demand strict compliance with the
written statement requirement of Morrissey-Gagnon. However, Kartman was an instance of a
federal court reviewing the acts of a state court just a short time after Gagnon was announced
and not in a direct appeal context.
Later, in United States v. Lacey,207 the federal district judge did not make findings of fact,
did not describe the evidence relied upon, and stated only general principles as reasons for the
revocation. The court held that the general conclusory reasons given for the revocation did not
meet the due process requirement that the revoking judge state the factual findings and the
reasons for the revocation. The court remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings which it said could include the task of making proper findings and stating proper
reasons for the revocation if the district court still believed revocation was warranted.
In Morishita v. Morris,208 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a state probation
revocation in which the state court did not prepare a written statement. Morishita contended he
was denied due process by that omission. The court of appeals distinguished Gagnon by
pointing out that Gagnon dealt with an administrative revocation, not a judicial revocation. In
Morashita, the state court had prepared a transcript of the proceedings and the state court was a
court of record. The court of appeals held that written findings are required constitutionally only
if the transcript and record do not enable a reviewing court to determine the basis of the trial
court's decision to revoke the probation.209 The Tenth Circuit seemed inclined to a more
informal and less burdensome revocation procedure than did the Eighth Circuit.
Then in Bearden v. Georgia,210 the United States Supreme Court held that in probation
revocation proceedings based upon a failure to pay fines or restitution the revocation court must
inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the probationer's failure to pay was willful or if
the probationer had failed to make good faith efforts to pay, then revocation followed by a
sentence within the statutorily prescribed limits of incarceration could be imposed. However, if
the probationer could not pay despite sufficient good faith efforts to amass the resources to do so,
then the revocation court must consider alternatives to imprisonment. Only if the alternatives are
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inadequate to satisfy the state's need for punishment and deterrence may imprisonment be
imposed on a probationer who has made sufficient good faith efforts to pay.211
In order to meet the Court's Bearden requirements, revocation courts must make adequate
records to sustain their decisions on appellate review. Findings of fact are necessary. The
findings must be accessible to the reviewing court. Whether written decisions are required in all
cases was not addressed. The revocation courts, therefore, must state their findings in open court
on the record or prepare detailed written decisions in order to facilitate appellate review.
In Black v. Romano,212 the Court held that revocation courts need not explicitly state why
alternatives to incarceration were rejected. The record before the Court included a memorandum
prepared by the state trial judge and a transcript of the proceedings. The Court considered the
memorandum and transcript to comport with due process,213 even though neither contained an
explicit statement of the revocation court's reasons for rejecting alternatives to imprisonment.
The majority opinion said the purpose of the Morrissey-Gagnon written statement requirement
was to help insure accurate fact finding with respect to any alleged violation and to provide an
adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by
the evidence.214 The concurring opinion said the written statement allows courts to determine
whether revocations are substantively valid or fundamentally unfair even without recorded
consideration of alternatives to revocation.215
Romano was a federal habeas action attacking a state judicial revocation. The Court did
not seem to back away from its commitment to the written statement requirement of Morrissey-
Gagnon. The distinction made in some of the cases of judicial as opposed to administrative
revocations as it relates to the need for a written statement may not have survived Romano.
Cautious revocation courts still will take the time to prepare written statements under the
Morrissey-Gagnon rules.
Two months after Romano, the Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Smith,216 an
appeal from a federal probation revocation. The federal district judge did not prepare a written
statement of evidence relied upon and the reasons for the revocation. Smith contended on appeal
that the absence of a written statement violated his due process rights and therefore a remand to
obtain a written statement was necessary in order to obtain a written statement for appellate
review purposes. The government contended the written statement requirement did not apply
because the revocation was conducted in a court of record and the hearing was transcribed. The
government relied on the Morishita decision.217 The court of appeals rejected the government's
contention for two reasons.
First, the Romano case dealt with a judicial revocation and the Court reaffirmed its
written statement requirement in Romano anyway. Second, the Morishita case was factually
distinguishable in that only one allegation of probation violation was involved in that case. In
Smith, there were two alleged probation violations. A written statement of the evidence relied
upon is thus necessary for a meaningful appellate review. As a result, the Nebraska Supreme
Court’s Jaworski218 rule lay dormant amid some doubt for a time.
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The Nebraska Court of Appeals cleared up that doubt in In re Thomas W,219 a juvenile
probation revocation case in which the county court judge, sitting as a juvenile court judge, did
not produce a full, detailed, written statement of the judge’s findings of fact, evidence relied on,
and reasons for revoking the juvenile’s probation. As a result, the juvenile sought on appeal to
invalidate the revocation. The Nebraska Court of Appeals reviewed the United States Supreme
Court’s pronouncements through Romano, noted the Nebraska Legislature’s adoption of the
Morrissey-Gagnon rules in the Juvenile Code, and ruled that a judge’s oral, in-court statements
transcribed in the bill of exceptions for use on appeal and supplemented by the judge’s written
revocation order could suffice to satisfy the written statement rule, both constitutional and
statutory. Sufficient specificity still must appear in the judge’s reported, oral statements.
None of the federal appellate courts has addressed the point made by the Nebraska
Supreme Court that the written statement requirement is more than is required in the underlying
criminal proceeding.220 The heavier caseload and lack of resources faced by state courts should
also be taken into consideration by federal courts in setting minimum requirements.221
DEFENSES
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not specifically named any defenses to probation
violation allegations. However, the court has considered several approaches that could constitute
defenses if the facts fit the theory advanced. Of course, the basic defenses lie in the denial of the
violation as a factual matter, in the presentation of facts that would excuse the violations, and in
the presentation of mitigating circumstances or other reasons why revocation would not be
warranted, despite the violation.
Illegally Obtained Evidence
State v. Howard 222 established the proposition that evidence seized in violation of the
federal constitution is incompetent evidence and is for that reason inadmissible in probation
revocation proceedings.223 Howard presented an unusual fact pattern in which the defendant's
probation forbade Howard from being in a state of intoxication in public or in a motor vehicle.
Howard was found alone and unconscious in a car that had been in a collision. A police officer
obtained a blood sample from Howard at the hospital while Howard was still unconscious
without a warrant, without consent, and under circumstances not covered by the implied consent
statute. The court held the sample was obtained involuntarily and in violation of the fourth
amendment.224 The generalization from Howard is that evidence obtained in violation of the
constitution cannot be used to revoke probation. However, evidence seized in a warrantless
residential search, to which a probationer is required to submit under a probation condition, can
be used to revoke probation.225
Inability to Pay
The Nebraska Supreme Court adopted the Bearden rule in State v. Heaton.226 In Heaton,
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the court held that where the alleged violation of probation is the failure to make restitution,
the evidence must clearly and convincingly show the probationer has willfully refused to make
restitution when the probationer has the resources to pay or has failed to make sufficient good
faith efforts to seek employment and otherwise acquire the resources to make restitution.227
Thus, indigent probationers can defend against failure to pay allegations on the grounds that their
failure to pay was not willful, that they have not had the resources to pay, and that they have
made sufficient good faith efforts to acquire the resources to pay.228 If the revocation court finds
the failure to pay was willful for reasons unrelated to ability to pay, then further analysis under
Bearden is unnecessary.229
Insufficiently Prompt Consideration
Nebraska law provides no special procedure to claim the state failed to afford an accused
probationer a prompt consideration of a motion to revoke. That means the only way to raise the
objection of no prompt consideration is as a defense to the revocation motion; a speedy trial act
motion for discharge will not work.230
A former probationer may be able to raise successfully the defense that the revocation
proceedings were not initiated within the probation term nor within a reasonable time thereafter
in a case where there has been a substantial time lapse between the end of the probation term and
the commencement of revocation proceedings. In State v. White,231 the court held that a
proceeding to revoke probation may be instituted within the probationary period or within a
reasonable time thereafter. The revocation proceeding in White was commenced on the day after
the term of probation ended.232
In State v. Hernandez,233 the defendant argued he had lost the opportunity to serve his
Nebraska and his Arizona sentences concurrently because Nebraska waited for his Arizona
sentence to expire before returning him to Nebraska for probation revocation proceedings based
on his Arizona crime. The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected that argument. The decision
focused on the claim that the state had failed to provide Hernandez with a prompt consideration
of the probation violation charge. The supreme court ruled:
if a defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction and the State wishes to charge
the defendant with violating probation, it provides the defendant with reasonably
‘prompt consideration’ of the charge if the State invokes the detainer process and
notifies the defendant of the pending revocation proceedings. Absent unusual
circumstances, the State is not required to extradite the defendant to revoke
probation and sentence the defendant before the term of the defendant's foreign
incarceration expires.234
In reaching that result, the supreme court applied its general test from State v. Windels235 for
evaluating the reasonableness of a delay that courts should consider such factors as the length of
any delay in proceedings against a probationer for probation revocation, the reasons for the
delay, and the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.
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The court distinguished the Windels situation from the Hernandez situation. In Windels,
the motion to revoke the defendant's probation was filed the day before the end of the defendant's
probationary term, October 2, 1990, and the defendant was not personally served with the
warrant on the alleged violation of probation until 6 months and 26 days after the filing of the
motion to revoke probation. On September 28, 1990, the Douglas County Court issued a warrant
for the defendant's arrest for violation of probation. On October 1, 1990, an affidavit alleging the
defendant's violation of probation was filed in the county court. The return on the warrant stated
that on October 3, 1990, notice of the warrant was mailed to the defendant's address by regular
U.S. mail without return receipt requested. Apparently, Windels did not learn of the existence of
the warrant until April 27, 1991, when he turned himself in. Nothing in the record indicated that
the state made any effort, other than mailing the warrant to the defendant's home address, to
serve the defendant with the warrant. The record contained no evidence to support a finding that
Windels had actual notice of the warrant before April 27, 1991.
The supreme court noted that service of a warrant by regular mail will not support an
inference that the accused had notice of a command to appear in court. Further, a presumption of
receipt of mail by the addressee does not arise unless it is shown that the letter was properly
addressed, stamped, and mailed. In Windels, the state produced no evidence that the envelope the
warrant was mailed in was properly addressed, stamped, and actually and regularly mailed. Thus,
the state failed to afford Windels with the required prompt consideration of the alleged
violations.
Actual notice of the filing of a motion to revoke seems an obvious enough requirement.
This time, I refer to “notice” in the sense of a document telling the alleged probation violator a
motion to revoke has been filed. The state could attempt reliance on the presumption of receipt
as long as the state proved it mailed a copy of the filed motion to revoke and notice to appear
properly addressed to the probationer at the last known address in an envelope with proper
postage affixed and deposited properly with the post office. But the need to rely on that
presumption arises from sloppy practice.
Several practical matters should be obvious. An alleged probation violator can refuse to
pick up regular mail notices and defeat the state’s attempt to proceed with a revocation action.
An alleged probation violator can refuse to pick up certified mail notices and defeat the state’s
attempt to proceed with a revocation action. The offender community will spread the word when
those techniques work. They will also spread the word when courts refuse to accept unproved
claims of attempts to notify alleged violators.
The supreme court isn’t insisting on the impossible. Just a little more effort than mailing
an arrest warrant by regular mail is all that’s necessary. Arrest warrants are served by making
arrests. Documented attempts to locate the alleged violator at the last known address and last
known place of employment go a long way toward presenting an evidentiary record of diligent
efforts to find the offender and help persuade courts that the offender is responsible for the lack
of notice. Obtaining issuance of an arrest warrant, putting the issuance on the computer, such as
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NCIC, and passively waiting for someone maybe to stop the offender for a traffic violation
and find the warrant on inquiry likely will not go a long way toward presenting an evidentiary
record of diligent efforts to find the offender. Once in custody and brought into court, the court
can give the probationer unimpeachable in-court, on-the-record, notice of further appearance
dates and of the allegations in the motion to revoke. Documented attempts to serve actual notice
also might work. Of course, the documented attempts at arrest or service will need testimony to
support their existence. Both actual arrest and personal service of the motion to revoke and
appearance date by a sheriff’s deputy or a process server can remove the need to rely on a weak
presumption.
Not-Yet-Final New Convictions
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not considered some other possible defenses such as a
claim that the later conviction alleged as a violation of probation is not final but is pending on
appeal, or a claim that the later conviction alleged as a probation violation was an invalid
conviction. The Nebraska Court of Appeals has considered the possible defense of claiming that
the later conviction alleged as a violation of probation is not final but is pending on appeal. The
appellate court ruled, in harmony with the uniform practice of courts across the country, that a
new criminal conviction, even though not yet final, and even if pending on appeal, may be used
as proof that a probationer has violated the conditions of his or her probation.236 Defeating
revocation actions is not included among the recognized purposes of criminal appeals.
The presumption of innocence of the new conviction does not apply in revocation
proceedings based on the new conviction even if pending on appeal. If it did apply, new criminal
behavior could not form the basis for revocations unless the substantial delay resulting from
appeals could be tolerated and such delay cannot be tolerated. Further, the state still could obtain
revocations using the same evidence it used to obtain the new convictions anyway. The standard
of proof in revocation actions is clear and convincing, not beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the
defense of not-yet-final new convictions does not exist even if some localities think it does.
MISCELLANEOUS
Invalid Conditions and Appeals
A probationer must take a direct appeal in order to attack the validity of a requirement of
a probation order as well as to attack the validity of the conviction on the grounds that the
probationer's guilty plea was involuntary.237 A probation sentence is a final, appealable
judgment. However, State v. Ozmun238 was an appeal after a probation revocation. In Ozmun, the
court took notice on its own motion that there was no showing in the plea taking record that
Ozmun was either represented or had waived counsel at the time of the prior conviction and
reversed the enhancement of the conviction.239
A probationer who did not challenge by direct appeal the validity of a condition of the
probation might be foreclosed from violating the condition involved and then attacking the
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validity of the condition in the ensuing revocation proceeding. However, the court could take
notice of the condition and its invalidity if that were the case. Also, the court might allow an
exception in order to do substantial justice. It seems doubtful that the court would enforce an
invalid probation condition simply because the probationer failed to take a direct appeal from the
initial imposition of the probation sentence. But the court just might do that in the interest of
finality.
Which Court Is the Sentencing Court
Under State v. Daniels,240 a case in which the county court tried the case and sentenced
the probationer, later affirmed by the district court on appeal, the district court does not obtain
jurisdiction to entertain the later revocation proceeding. The county court remains the sentencing
court, despite the concept that the judgment of the district court vacates the judgment of the
county court even if affirmed on appeal.241 The Daniels decision was worded broadly enough
that it also should apply in cases in which the district court reverses or modifies the sentence of
the county court. The district court, when hearing appeals from the county court, acts as an
intermediate court of appeals. Appellate courts do not have jurisdiction over matters requiring
the taking of evidence unless a special statute applies. The district court reviews county court
judgments for error on the record only.242
The New Sentence
Earlier, I said revocation of probation under the present system should result in the
imposition of a new sentence as a matter of course. The new sentence, however, cannot be a
sentence under an amended statute increasing or decreasing the severity of the possible sentence
on the underlying conviction. “[O]ne whose probation is revoked is subject to sentencing under
the statute in effect at the time of conviction. The court can impose such sentence as it could
have imposed originally for the crime.”243 The penal statute in effect at the time of the original
sentence to a term of probation applies, not that which is effective at the time of sentencing
following the revocation.244
The revocation court, in imposing the new sentence, also does not work under any
restriction of the new sentence to a sentence of incarceration no longer, in terms of time, than the
length of the original probation.245
The Nebraska Supreme Court disapproved the practice of terminating probations on an
unsuccessful or unsatisfactory basis in State v. Caniglia.246 When the state brought revocation
proceedings against Caniglia, the district judge terminated the defendant’s probation as
unsuccessful. The supreme court explained:
Given the violation, under § 29-2268, the district court was authorized to revoke
probation and impose a sentence, to reprimand and warn the probationer, to
intensify supervision, to impose additional terms of probation, or to extend the
term of probation. The district court did none of the above. Instead, the district
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court ordered the probation ‘terminated as unsuccessful.’ This was neither an
authorized order nor a sentence.247
Thus, trial court judges no longer have available that somewhat more amicable avenue of
resolving probation revocation actions.
Jail Credit
Jail time imposed as a condition of probation and not as a part of a sentence does not
count against time imposed on a new sentence after revocation.248 However, if a probationer is
arrested and held pending revocation proceedings and was arrested for the revocation
proceedings, the time spent in jail awaiting revocation probably should be credited against a
maximum sentence imposed after revocation; if the arrest was for some other reason, probably
not.249 Whether presentence jail time must be credited against any jail time imposed as a
condition of probation remains an open question, but granting credit does not prejudice anyone.
Driver's License Sanctions
The Schulz decision created a serious limitation on courts imposing driver's license
sanctions after probation revocations on all criminal charges to which court ordered driver's
license sanctions applied as part of straight (non-probation) sentences.250 The statute involved in
Schulz required the sentencing court to revoke a straight sentenced offender's license "as part of
the judgment of conviction . . . for a period of one year from the date of . . . conviction."251 The
court found that statutory language modified the general statute allowing courts to impose on
probation violators such new sentences as might have been imposed originally.252 The probation
sentence is the judgment of conviction. The supreme court reasoned the statute in Schulz allowed
a one year license revocation for only the period of the one year following imposition of the
probation sentence. Therefore, on re-sentence following revocation of the probation sentence,
the trial court could not revoke Schulz's license for one year commencing on the date of the re-
sentence. Schulz involved a 2d offense driving under the influence conviction. The Legislature
attempted to remove the Schulz limitation by its adoption of LB 377 (1988)253 for all driving
under the influence and refusal to submit cases arising after the effective date of LB 377
(1988).254
The Legislature also has attempted to remove the Schulz limitation from any of the other
offenses to which Schulz logically applies. It is necessary, therefore, that courts and counsel
carefully consider the effect of Schulz whenever probation is revoked and a new sentence is
imposed on any charge for which a driver's license sanction is part of the sentence. While the
applicability of Schulz depends upon the language of the statute involved, Schulz probably still
applies across the board to all driver's license sanction sentences, with the possible exception of
sanctions imposed under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-496 (Lexis 2007). Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-496 does
not refer to the date of the judgment or imposing the license sanction as a part of the judgment of
conviction.255
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Violation of Non-Probation Community Service Sentences
The Legislature has authorized the use of community service sentences as an alternative
to fines or imprisonment to be imposed as a condition of probation sentences or as straight (non-
probation) sentences for specified classes of offenses.256 Offenders who fail to perform
community service sentences may be arrested, and, after a hearing, be re-sentenced on the
original charge, have their probations revoked, or be found in contempt.257 If the failure to
perform is a violation of a probation condition, the required hearing obviously must be a
probation revocation hearing conducted in compliance with the Morrissey-Gagnon rules.
Normal contempt procedures should be used if the failure is treated as a contempt.258 But, if the
failure to perform is a violation of a straight sentence, and the court259 chooses to use the re-
sentence approach, then the procedures to be followed at the required hearing are not prescribed
in the statute.
Since one function of alternative sentences to community service is to allow offenders
who might otherwise be imprisoned260 to retain their liberty subject to the condition that they
perform the community service as ordered,261 the position of an offender straight-sentenced to
perform community service is analogous to the position of a probationer. Such an offender has
an interest in continued conditional liberty much like the interest of a probationer in continued
conditional liberty. The state has an interest in efficient enforcement of the community service
sentence.
The procedures required by Morrissey and Gagnon, at the minimum, probably should
apply to the situation of alleged community service straight sentence violators. Trial courts
would be following a seemingly safe path should they apply the Morrissey-Gagnon rules to
community service straight sentence violation hearings. Counsel for both parties should advocate
the use of the Morrissey-Gagnon rules at the minimum in such cases.262 Criminal contempt
procedures, considerably more demanding, also might apply. We must await resolution of this
lack of clarity in the community service sentence statutes through judicial interstitial law
making.263
CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court, and the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals apply essentially the same rules to probation revocation proceedings, except
with respect to the requirement of written statements of evidence relied upon and reasons for
revocation, the need for preliminary hearings, and the types of violations that warrant revocation.
The Nebraska Supreme Court does not require written statements of evidence relied upon and
reasons for revocation in adult cases, even though it has said the better practice is to prepare such
statements when there are two or more alleged violations. The Nebraska Court of Appeals does
require at least oral, on the record, statements of evidence relied upon and reasons for revocation
in juvenile cases. Both the Eighth Circuit and the United States Supreme Court require written
statements, although the Eighth Circuit has not insisted on detailed statements from state
revocation courts. The Nebraska Supreme Court requires preliminary hearings or waivers in all
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cases on independent state grounds. The Eighth Circuit requires preliminary hearings only for
probationers who are in custody. The United States Supreme Court has not taken a position
since Gagnon. The Nebraska Supreme Court has affirmed revocations based upon violations of
any condition of probation. The Eighth Circuit sometimes requires and sometimes does not
require law violations or antisocial acts as the predicates for revocation. The United States
Supreme Court has taken a position only with respect to failure to make restitution as the alleged
violation.
Because of the fiction that probation revocation proceedings are not part of their
antecedent criminal proceedings, many of the rules of criminal procedure do not apply.
Probation revocation law forms a discrete, developing legal area, a basic knowledge of which
should be mastered by judges and those practitioners who handle criminal cases only
sporadically as well as criminal law specialists. The basic rules are established. Only the finer
points remain to be developed. In the absence of specific precedents or statutory provisions,
fundamental fairness to both the prosecution and the probationer should be the guiding star when
an unanswered question of procedure arises in a probation revocation proceeding.
* District Court Judge, Fifth Judicial District of Nebraska, 1995 to present; County Court Judge, Fifth Judicial
District of Nebraska, 1980-1995; B.A. 1971 and J.D. 1975, University of Nebraska-Lincoln. Nothing in this article
should be taken as an official position of the author or the judges of any other Nebraska courts.
1. I thank the Nebraska Law Review for granting permission to reprint here substantial parts of this article in its
1989 form. See Alan G. Gless, Nebraska Probation Revocation--A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 516 (1989). We have
incidental temporal symmetry with these two versions of this article. The 1989 article was published eighteen years
after the Nebraska Probation Act’s adoption; this revision appears eighteen years after the publication of the first
version.
2. The amendments’ importance led Deb A. Minardi, Nebraska’s Deputy State Probation Administrator/Community
Corrections Programs Coordinator, to ask me for this revision. Deb’s comments after her review of an earlier draft
of this 2007 revision improved this revision and I thank Deb for sharing her insights with me.
3. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246 (4) (Lexis 2007)(all citations to Neb. Rev. Stat. (Lexis 2007) are current through the
2006 Second Legislative Session). Given the inclusion of persons found delinquent or in need of special supervision
in the statutory definition of probation, coupled with the inclusion of juvenile courts in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246 (2)
(Lexis 2007) the Probation Administration Act now obviously must be construed to apply to probation dispositions
in juvenile cases heard by county courts and separate juvenile courts, as well as to probation sentences in the adult
criminal system, except where special provisions of the Juvenile Code control. E.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. §43-286 (4)
(Lexis 2007) relating to revocation of juvenile probations. The definition of court for purposes of the Probation
Administration Act now does include the separate juvenile courts, as well as county courts sitting as juvenile courts.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246 (2) (Cum. Supp. 1988) did not include the separate juvenile courts.
4. State v. Lynch, 223 Neb. 849, 394 N.W.2d 651 (1986); State v. Christiansen, 217 Neb. 740, 351 N.W.2d 67
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(1984); & State v. Kinney, 217 Neb. 701, 350 N.W.2d 552 (1984).
5. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268 (Lexis 2007). We could nitpick about whether imposition of a sentence following the
revocation of a probation sentence is a sentencing or a re-sentencing, but I use re-sentencing and imposition of a
new sentence as synonymous in this article (and so does the American Law Institute). Defining one’s own terms
one’s own way does happen to fall within the range of an author’s privileges, after all.
6. In fact, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided no cases of importance to Nebraska probation revocation
since 1989.
7. 9 Neb. App. 824, 621 N.W.2d 821 (2000)(single-judge decision). State v. Poppe, 2006 Neb. App. LEXIS 200
(Neb. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2006), explains later developments suggest single-judge decisions may not be precedential,
however, even if not precedential, single-judge appellate decisions can be instructive, even persuasive, to later
appellate court panels. Counsel and trial judges cannot afford to ignore single-judge appellate opinions.
8. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
9. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2246 to 29-2268 ((Lexis 2007)) [hereinafter referred to as the Probation Act or the Act].
10. The legislative history reveals the Legislature was not told it was based on the ABA Standards, but the
Nebraska Supreme Court said it was in State v. Dovel, 189 Neb. 173, 201 N.W.2d 820 (1972). Compare, ALI
Model Penal Code §§ 301.1 et seq. (P.O.D. 1962). The Act appears to be a combination of the ABA Standards and
the Model Penal Code provisions relating to probation.
11. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246 (4) (Lexis 2007). Prior to the adoption of the Probation Act, sentence was suspended
and then probation was granted. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2218 (Reissue 1964)("the court may, in its
discretion, enter an order, without pronouncing sentence, suspending further proceedings and placing the accused on
probation").
12. Reasonable cause and probable cause are synonymous. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 5.1(b) (2d ed. 1987).
13. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266 (1) (Reissue 1985). Presumably the county attorney then had discretion to file or
decline to file a revocation motion, although a strong argument could have been made that the county attorney had
no discretion after a court referral. But, see, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266 (4).
14. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266 (2) (Reissue 1985) & (Lexis 2007). The probation officer could then and can now
ask any peace officer for assistance in effecting a warrantless arrest of a probationer.
15. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266 (3) (Reissue 1985).
16. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(1)(b) (Lexis 2007). For present purposes, the fees non-payment of which may
constitute a form of non-criminal violation generally include the probation administration enrollment fee and the
monthly probation administration programming fees, and, possibly the monthly chemical testing fees along with
potentially only a very few other fees ordered as part of adult probation sentences. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2262.06
(Lexis 2007).
17. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,197.04 (Lexis 2007).
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18. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,164 (Lexis 2007).
19. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-672 (Lexis 2007).
20. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(2)(a) (Lexis 2007) specifies the decision to impose administrative sanctions in lieu of
formal revocation proceedings rests with the probation officer and his or her chief probation officer or such chief's
designee and shall be based upon the probationer's risk level, the severity of the violation, and the probationer's
response to the violation. The probation officers then must use a matrix under Neb. Prob. Sys., Pol. & Proc. Man.,
Response to Offender Non-Compliance 5-101 to 5-116 (Oct. 2003), in an effort to make their decision on a
standardized and objective basis.
21. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(2)(a) (Lexis 2007).
22. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(2)(b) (Lexis 2007).
23. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(2)(a) (Lexis 2007).
24. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2277 to 29-2279 (Lexis 2007).
25. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(7) (Lexis 2007).
26. Neb. Prob. Sys., Pol. & Proc. Man., Response to Offender Non-Compliance 5-101 to 5-116 (Oct. 2003).
27. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(3) (Lexis 2007).
28. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(4) (Lexis 2007).
29. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(5) (Lexis 2007).
30. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2266(2)(a) (Lexis 2007).
31. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2267 (Lexis 2007).
32. Id. The pre-Act case law contained one inconsistency of importance. In one case, the court said the state's
burden of proof in a revocation hearing was to present any probative evidence sufficient to convince the trial court
that the probationer's conduct in violating probation indicated the probationer would not refrain from future criminal
conduct without punishment. State v. Ward, 182 Neb. 370, 154 N.W.2d 758 (1967). But in an earlier case, the
court said proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not required. Clear and satisfactory evidence was sufficient to
prove a probation violation. Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb. 669, 77 N.W.2d 237 (1956). The court was never called
upon to resolve the apparent conflict. The Act resolved the conflict.
33. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2267 (Lexis 2007).
34. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268 (Lexis 2007).
35. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-101 et. seq. (Lexis 2007).
36. At least not in the southern six counties of the Fifth Judicial District. The evidence supporting the statement
relating to increased use of warrantless arrests remains anecdotal. Sometimes anecdotal evidence suffices, because
it’s all there is.
37. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2267 (2) (Lexis 2007).
38. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-401 et. seq. (Lexis 2007).
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39. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,102(6) (Lexis 2007). This provision appears to be a leftover from the days when county
courts did not have the authority to sentence offenders to probation and there was no statewide probation system.
40. Neb. Prob. Sys., Pol. & Proc. Man., supra, n. 20 at 5-102 to 5-104.
41. 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
42. Or, McLaughlin, as many commentators shorten it; I prefer calling it Riverside, as does the Seventh Circuit U.S.
Court of Appeals.
43. A Nebraska felony arraignment cannot be held until the filing of an information in district court after either a
preliminary hearing (an adversarial proceeding) or waiver of preliminary hearing, generally, but not necessarily
held in county, but also possible in district court, and an order from the preliminary hearing court binding the case
over for trial in the district court. A Nebraska felony arraignment does not consist of an appearance simply for a
probable cause determination or a bond setting. A Nebraska felony arraignment consists of the proceeding in the
trial court with felony jurisdiction at which the court advises the accused of the charges and possible penalties, trial
rights, plea options and consequences, takes a plea to the general issue (assuming no other procedural motions
prevent taking a plea to the general issue, such as a motion to quash, demurrer, plea in abatement, and similar
activities) and more.
44. 77 F.3d 285 (9th Cir. 1996).
45. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 289.
46. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2121 (3) & (4) (Lexis 2007).
47. Id.
48. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-104 (Lexis 2007).
49. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-403 & 29-404 (Lexis 2007).
50. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-404 (Lexis 2007). This duty is modified by the discretion to issue citations in-lieu-of-arrest
whenever the court believes a citation would serve all of the purposes of an arrest warrant. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-
425 (Lexis 2007). See, generally, Alan G. Gless, Arrest and Citation: Definition and Analysis, 59 NEB. L. REV. 279
(1980).
51. Which is the real basis for contempt proceedings.
52. There was a clear, direct grant of authority to issue probation violation arrest warrants before 1971, but it was
deleted and not replaced when the Probation Administration Act was proposed and adopted. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. §
29-2219 (Reissue 1964).
53. See, Cohen & Gobert, The Law of Probation and Parole § 9.03 (1983). The fiction that probation violation
proceedings are not criminal proceedings leads to this result.
54. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-901 et. seq. (Lexis 2007). The probation sentence is the judgment.
55. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2730 (3) (Lexis 2007) & § 29-2302 & 2303 (Lexis 2007).
56. State ex. rel. Partin v. Jensen, 203 Neb. 441, 279 N.W.2d 120 (1979).
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57. Id., at 447, 279 N.W.2d at 123.
58. Release on bail and even on their own recognizance remains routine practice in the southern six counties of the
Fifth Judicial District. But routine practice varies by locality.
The Parole Board has statutory authority to release alleged parole violators pending revocation proceedings.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 83-1,119 (Lexis 2007).
59. Compare, ABA Standards, Probation §§ 5.1 et seq. (1970).
60. Although the Legislature did amend the Juvenile Code's probation revocation provision and the parole
revocation statutes to reflect the Court's developments. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-286 (4) (Lexis 2007) & § 83-
1,119 et. seq. (Lexis 2007).
61. Referring to Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
62. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
63. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
64. State v. Holiday, 182 Neb. 229, 153 N.W.2d 855, modified, 182 Neb. 410, 155 N.W.2d 855 (1967) [hereinafter
referred to as Holiday I and Holiday II].
65. Holiday I, at 233, 153 N.W.2d at 858.
66. Holiday I at 232, 153 N.W.2d at 857.
67. This article will not examine the demise of right/privilege analysis in constitutional law.
68. Supra, n. 64.
69. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
70. Id., at 137 (because of the sentencing aspect, not the revocation aspect). Thus, Mempa became the first shot in
the building revolution.
71. Supra, n. 64.
72. The court withdrew only that part of Holiday I that dealt with the right to appointed counsel in revocation
proceedings. The statement that there is only a statutory right to be heard before revocation of probation was
included in the court's analysis of the right to counsel issue.
73. Phoenix v. State, 162 Neb. 669, 673, 77 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1956).
74. Id.
75. 182 Neb. 370, 154 N.W.2d 758 (1967).
76. 155 Neb. 261, 51 N.W.2d 326 (1952).
77. Id., at 268-69, 51 N.W.2d at 330-331.
78. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-401 (Lexis 2007).
79. Other than those with respect to privileges. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1102 (4) (b) (Lexis 2007).
80. In Re Interest of D.L.S., 230 Neb. 435, 438, 432 N.W.2d 31, 34 (1988).
81. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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82. Id., at 488. Justice Douglas dissented from the detailed minimum requirements on the ground that the Court
should not tell the states the precise procedures they should follow. Id., at 499-500.
83. Id., at 488.
84. Id., at 486-87.
85. Id., at 487.
86. Id., at 488.
87. Id.
88. Id., at 489.
89. Id. The Court did not reach or decide the question of whether accused parolees would be entitled to the
assistance of counsel, retained or appointed. Id.
90. 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (8-1 decision).
91. Id. at 779 & 780.
92. Id., at 790 & 791.
93. Supra, n. 69.
94. State v. Kartman, 192 Neb. 803, 224 N.W.2d 753 (1975).
95. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
96. Id., at 125, n. 26.
97. Id., at 120.
98. Id., at 122.
99. Id.
100. Id., at 121, n. 22. The Court gave no evidence of the frequency upon which it relied.
101. It could be argued that more should be required to deprive accused persons of their liberty, but any such
argument would ignore centuries of tradition and run headlong into the current get tough on criminals political
philosophy. The effort to make the argument, most likely, would not be successful.
102. Cf., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
103. U.S.C.S. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 (Lexis 2007).
104. 503 F.2d 1081 (8th Cir. 1974); accord, Petition of Meidinger, 168 Mont. 7, 539 P.2d 1185 (1975). See also,
Armstrong v. State, 312 So. 2d 620 (Ala. 1975)(no need for preliminary hearing if adequate notice and sufficient
time to prepare a defense are granted).
105. Id., at 1084.
106. Id.
107. Notes of Advisory Committee, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1 at p. 36 (U.S.C.S. Cum. Supp. 1987). The federal rule
only applies to probation revocations in federal courts. However, given the process followed in developing federal
rules, the federal rule does represent an authoritative interpretation of federal constitutional requirements that could
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be useful to the prosecution in appropriate cases. See, also, United States v. Sutton, 607 F.2d 220 (8th Cir.
1979)(failure to hold preliminary hearing harmless error where probationer serving sentence of imprisonment on
new conviction at time of probation violation arrest). In Chilembwe v. Wyrick, 574 F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1978), the
court held that where obtaining permission before leaving the state is a condition of probation, a probationer's
presence in another state without permission is sufficient probable cause to believe the probationer has violated
probation to dispense with the requirement of a preliminary hearing.
108. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-504 to 29-506 (Lexis 2007).
109. The rules are different with respect to felony charges brought by indictment.
110. Lingo v. Hann, 161 Neb. 67, 71 N.W.2d 716 (1955).
111. Id.
112. Maher v. State, 144 Neb. 463, 13 N.W.2d 641 (1944); & Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1816 (Lexis 2007).
113. State v. Ferree, 207 Neb. 593, 299 N.W.2d 777 (1980).
114. State v. Franklin, 194 Neb. 630, 234 N.W.2d 610 (1975).
115. 207 Neb. 593, 299 N.W.2d 777 (1980).
116. The charging instrument in probation revocation matters properly is denominated either a motion or an
information, not a complaint. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2266 (3) (b) & 29-2267 (Lexis 2007).
117. The sufficiency of the evidence at the final hearing must not have been raised as an issue on appeal.
118. Id., at 597, 299 N.W.2d at 779.
119. Whether the due process the court found had been denied Ferree was federal or state due process is impossible
to determine from the court's opinion. Of course, there may be no difference.
120. But, the Eighth Circuit has held that written notice is not required before the preliminary hearing, only before
the final hearing. United States v. Pattman, 535 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1976).
121. See, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
122. The supreme court has adopted a county court rule that requires waivers of felony preliminary hearings to be
made on the record through the court's supervisory power over state court procedures. Neb. Cty. Ct. Gen. R. 15
(Lexis 2007).
123. I’ve written elsewhere of the inherent redundancy of that phrase, “knowing, voluntary and intelligent.” A
waiver cannot be intelligent if not knowing, and, in the same sense, cannot be voluntary, if not intelligent. Alan G.
Gless, Nebraska Plea-Based Convictions Practice: A Primer & Commentary, 79 NEB. L. REV. 293 (2000).
124. The record should demonstrate the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of any such waiver because the
supreme court cited to Boykin v. Alabama, supra, n. 121.
125. Morrissey at 485.
126. I.e., the arrest for the probation violation or an arrest for a new criminal charge forming the basis for the
violation arrest?
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127. Anecdotally, again, at least in the six southern counties of the Fifth Judicial District, but also, again, only
anecdotally supported, the situation differs in the more populous areas.
128. State v. Kartman, 192 Neb. 803, 806, 299 N.W.2d 753, 755 (1975).
129. Kartman v. Parratt, 397 F. Supp. 531, 533 (D. Neb. 1975).
130. 207 Neb. 593, 299 N.W.2d 777 (1980).
131. 212 Neb. 248, 322 N.W.2d 426 (1982).
132. In State v. Moreno, 193 Neb. 351, 227 N.W.2d 398 (1975), the probationer attacked the use of the chief district
probation officer as the preliminary hearing officer, but did not make his objection until he was before the supreme
court. The supreme court did not reach the issue as a result. In State v. McFarland, 195 Neb. 395, 238 N.W.2d 237
(1976), the county court conducted the preliminary hearing on a felony probation revocation motion. The district
court conducted the final revocation hearing. No issue was raised before the supreme court on the identity of the
preliminary hearing officer.
133. The idea of preserving the sentencing judge's impartiality by keeping the sentencing judge's mind empty
regarding the facts of the case is a myth. Impartiality is a characteristic of an open, disciplined mind --- not an
empty mind. The sentencing judge, at least in smaller jurisdictions, will have reviewed the probation officer's
violation information report and will have advised the probationer of the alleged violation/s at the intake hearing. If
an arrest warrant or a warrantless arrest is involved, the sentencing judge also will have considered the case in acting
on the application for the arrest warrant and bail hearing.
134. Use of probation officers from other probation districts would solve this problem, but would not provide for a
bail or bond hearing.
135. Morrissey at 487.
136. 535 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1976).
137. The Nebraska Supreme Court has not decided any cases on the sufficiency of the preliminary hearing officer's
report.
138. The rights of accused probationers to confront adverse witnesses at preliminary hearing and to appear and
present evidence at preliminary hearing have not been dealt with in any published decisions of the Nebraska Court
of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, or the United States Supreme Court
since the adoption of the Morrissey-Gagnon rules. See, Cohen & Gobert, supra, n. 30, at § 9.22 et seq.
139. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487-88.
140. Id.
141. Id., at 489-90.
142. Id., at 489. Consistent with the view that a probation revocation proceeding is not part of a criminal
prosecution, the Court has held the Interstate Agreement on Detainers does not apply to probation violation
detainers. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985).
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143. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. Both in Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490, and in Carchman, supra, n. 142, 473 U.S. at
731, the Court indicated its belief that a new criminal conviction was conclusive proof of a probation violation.
144. Id., at 479.
145. Id., at 480.
146. E.g., third degree sexual assault, driving under the influence of alcohol, etc.
147. 197 Neb. 42, 246 N.W.2d 657 (1976).
148. Id., at 47, 246 N.W.2d at 660.
149. 573 F.2d 1020 (8th Cir. 1978).
150. Id., at 1024-25.
151. Of course, imposing such probation terms ignores or violates the personal autonomy of individual offenders,
but whether sentencing that violates individual autonomy is philosophically justifiable is a question outside the
scope of this article. Any sentencing having as its goal the rehabilitation of the offender may violate the personal
autonomy of individual offenders.
152. 536 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1976).
153. 807 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
154. 588 F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1978).
155. Id., at 606-607.
156. 588 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1978).
157. Smallwood was decided by Circuit Judges Van Oosterhout and Henley and District Judge Devitt. Reed was
decided by Circuit Judges Lay and Bright and District Judge Van Sickle. Burkhalter was decided by Circuit Judges
Lay, Ross, and McMillian. Rodgers was decided by Circuit Judges Bright, Stephenson, and McMillian. Goeller
was decided by Circuit Judges Fagg, Bowman, and Timbers (Judge Timbers was a Second Circuit Court of Appeals
judge sitting by designation with the Eighth Circuit in Goeller).
158. State v. Sievers, 2 Neb. App. 463, 511 N.W.2d 205 (1994).
159. 192 Neb. 803, 224 N.W.2d 753 (1975).
160. Kartman v. Parratt, 397 F. Supp. 531, 533-34 (D. Neb. 1975).
161. Id., at 534.
162. Kartman v. Parratt, 535 F.2d 450, 456 (8th Cir. 1976).
163. Under State v. Ferree, supra, n. 113, any change in the nature or identity of the alleged violations after
preliminary hearing would require a new preliminary hearing to be offered to the probationer.
164. Kartman v. Parratt, supra, n. 162, at 453.
165. 212 Neb. 248, 322 N.W.2d 426 (1982).
166. Id., at 251, 322 N.W.2d at 428-429.
167. 185 Neb. 58, 173 N.W.2d 395 (1970).
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168. Id., at 60, 173 N.W.2d at 396.
169. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489.
170. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949); & State v. Whitehurst, 224 Neb. 174, 396 N.W.2d 433 (1984).
171. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
172. Supra, n. 162.
173. Id., at 456-457.
174. United States v. Bell, 785 F.2d 640, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1986).
175. Id., at 643.
176. Supra, n. 174.
177. Id., at 642-43.
178. Id., at 643, n. 3.
179. Id., at 643.
180. Id., at 643-44. In United States v. Pattman, 535 F.2d 1062 (8th Cir. 1976), the alleged violation was a failure
to report an arrest. The court of appeals approved admission of an arrest report for the limited purpose of proving an
arrest was made.
181. Id., at 644.
182. Id., at 644-45. The Eighth Circuit adhered to the Bell decision in United States v. Burton, 866 F.2d 1057 (8th
Cir. 1989), as it relates to the use of laboratory reports without live foundation testimony. Bell was decided by
Circuit Judges Arnold and Wollman and District Judge Gunn. Burton was decided by Circuit Judges Arnold,
Gibson and Bright.
183. 194 Neb. 740, 235 N.W.2d 402 (1975).
184. Id., at 744, 235 N.W.2d at 404-405.
185. 221 Neb. 481, 378 N.W.2d 170 (1985).
186. This is no small assumption and is probably erroneous. However, in view of the supreme court's language in
In re D.L.S., supra, n. 80, that the rules of evidence can be used in deciding what type of evidence satisfies due
process, the court may have left an escape hatch open for counsel who fail to object specifically on confrontation
grounds.
187. 8 Neb. Ct. App. 525, 598 N.W.2d 765 (1999).
188. Id., at 528-29, 598 N.W.2d at 767.
189. Id., at 528, 598 N.W.2d at 767.
190. Id.
191. 465 U.S. 420 (1984)(6-3 decision).
192. Id., at 435, n. 7.
193. Id., at 429, n. 5.
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194. State v. Sites, 231 Neb. 624, 437 N.W.2d 166 (1989). The alleged violations Sites was compelled to testify
about were his failure to attend AA meetings and to comply with Antabuse therapy as conditions of a DWI and DUS
probation. Those violations are not separate crimes. Thus, no constitutional problem.
Sites represents the extent of development of the idea of compelled testimony of an accused probation violator.
There are several instances in which accused probationers conceivably could be subject to efforts to compel their
testimony about separate criminal offenses in their own revocation proceedings. Each such instance presents issues
in the area of inapplicability of the privilege, all of which are beyond the scope of this article. For example,
compelled testimony about a crime for which the witness has been pardoned, or on which the statute of limitations
has run, or as to which the witness has already been convicted, or with respect to which the witness has been granted
immunity does not implicate the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination because incrimination is not
possible in such instances. Other protective rules may apply, such as the privilege under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1210
(Lexis 2007) or due process considerations, but the self-incrimination privilege per se does not.
For use at the later criminal trial of a parolee’s admission of the offense on trial made before the Parole
Board, see, State v. Portsche, 2006 Neb. App. LEXIS 153 (Neb. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2006)(not designated for
permanent publication).
195. 223 Neb. 867, 394 N.W.2d 665 (1986).
196. Id., at 869-70, 394 N.W.2d at 667. The court also disapproved of any suggestion in a prior case that an
admission of a probation violation is a guilty plea. State v. Blankenbaker, 197 Neb. 344, 248 N.W.2d 773 (1977).
The Eighth Circuit agrees with the Nebraska Supreme Court that an admission to a probation violation charge is
not a guilty plea, but an admission. Admitting a probation violation is not even the equivalent of pleading guilty to a
criminal charge. As a result, a probationer need not be advised of the privilege prior to tendering an admission at a
revocation proceeding. United States v. Rapert, 813 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1987).
197. 503 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1974).
198. 625 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1980). But see, Hicks v. State, 452 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd 478 So. 2d
22 (Fla. 1985)(before accepting plea in probation revocation proceeding, court must advise of right to counsel);
State v. Bryan, 395 A.2d 475 (Md. Ct. App. 1978)(Md. R. Crim. P. apply to probation revocation proceedings).
199. United States v. Segal, 549 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 919 (1977). For a complete
discussion of the requirements of Boykin v. Alabama, see Alan G. Gless, Nebraska Plea-Based Convictions
Practice: A Primer & Commentary, 79 NEB. L. REV. 293 (2000).
200. 813 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1987).
201. Id., at 185. Any implication that Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 applies to probation revocations arising out of the court's
language in United States v. Smallwood, 536 F.2d 1257 (8th Cir. 1976) is invalid after Rapert.
202. 194 Neb. 645, 234 N.W.2d 221 (1975); accord, State v. MacFarland, 195 Neb. 395, 238 N.W.2d 237 (1976);
& Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1983).
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203. Id., at 647, 234 N.W.2d at 223.
204. Id., at 647-48, 234 N.W.2d at 223.
205. Supra, n. 162.
206. Id., at 457-458.
207. 648 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1981).
208. 702 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1983).
209. Id., at 210.
210. 461 U.S. 660 (1983)(announced two months after Morashita).
211. Id., at 672.
212. 471 U.S. 606 (1985)(6-2-1 decision).
213. Id., at 616.
214. Id., at 613-14. What the Court meant by transcript is unclear in Nebraska practice, but clear in federal practice.
In Nebraska practice, a transcript consists of certified copies of case filings. A transcription is a written verbatim
record of oral proceedings prepared and used for purposes other than appeals. If prepared and used for an appeal,
then a transcription is a bill of exceptions.
215. Id., at 619. The Court also noted the diminished justification for requiring judges to explain their rulings when
the risk of unfairness has already been minimized by other procedural safeguards. Id.
216. 767 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1985).
217. Discussed supra at nn. 208-209.
218. Discussed, supra, at nn. 202-204.
219. 3 Neb. App. 704, 530 N.W.2d 291 (1995).
220. Again, one could argue that more should be done in entering verdicts of conviction in terms of stating the
evidence relied upon in reaching findings of guilt and perhaps the reasoning process used in deciding criminal cases.
However, requiring juries to produce written statements of the evidence they relied upon and their reasoning
processes would be quite awkward in most cases. No more should be required of judges hearing criminal cases
without juries than is required of the juries themselves.
221. There have been no published Nebraska, Eighth Circuit, or United States Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the probationer's right to appear in person and to present witnesses and defense evidence at the final hearing.
See, Cohen & Gobert, supra, n. 30 at § 922 et. seq.
222. 193 Neb. 45, 225 N.W.2d 391 (1975).
223. Id., at 54, 225 N.W.2d at 397.
224. Id., at 53, 225 N.W.2d at 396. The Eighth Circuit has held the fourth amendment exclusionary rule does not
apply in probation revocation proceedings. United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978).
225. State v. Morgan, 206 Neb. 818, 295 N.W.2d 285 (1980).
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226. 225 Neb. 702, 407 N.W.2d 780 (1987); followed in State v. Englehart, 231 Neb. 579, 437 N.W.2d 468 (1989).
227. Id., at 705, 407 N.W.2d at 783.
228. The Legislature has adopted the Bearden standard as part of its restitution sentencing act. Neb. Rev. Stat. §
29-2284 (Lexis 2007)(which expressly applies to probation revocations).
The situation of persons sentenced to probation on convictions of criminal non-support with a probation
requirement that they pay support arrearages is analogous to the situation of defendants required to pay restitution
and fines as conditions of probation. Probationers in such cases against whom revocations are sought on the basis of
failure to pay their support arrearages logically ought to able to interpose the defense of inability to pay under
Bearden. Back child support is a debt as is restitution. Indigence is the same in either case.
229. Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 423 (8th Cir. 1986).
230. State v. Sklenar, 269 Neb. 98, 690 N.W.2d 631 (2005).
231. 193 Neb. 93, 225 N.W.2d 426 (1975).
232. Id., at 94, 225 N.W.2d at 427.
233. 273 Neb. 456, 730 N.W.2d 96 (2007).
234. Id., at 463, 730 N.W.2d at 101.
235. 244 Neb. 30, 503 N.W.2d 834 (1993).
236. State v. Sievers, 2 Neb. App. 463, 511 N.W.2d 205 (1994).
237. State v. Williams, 194 Neb. 483, 233 N.W.2d 772 (1975); State v. Jacobson, 221 Neb. 639, 379 N.W.2d 772
(1986). Of course, post-conviction proceedings and federal habeas proceedings are not affected by the rules relating
to direct appeals. In the context of an appeal from a revocation of probation by a federal district court, the Eighth
Circuit refused to consider the probationer's claims that his plea to the underlying charge was involuntary and that he
had ineffective counsel at that time. United States v. Goeller, 807 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1986).
238. 221 Neb. 481, 378 N.W.2d 170 (1985).
239. Id., at 482, 378 N.W.2d at 172 (nor was there a record of an enhancement hearing nor of the trial court's
findings on enhancement).
240. 224 Neb. 264, 397 N.W.2d 631 (1986).
241. Neb. Rev. Stat. § § 25-2733(3) (Lexis 2007).
242. Id., at 266-267, 397 N.W.2d at 633. The record on appeal need not be complete. It is sufficient if it contains
enough evidence to establish a violation by clear and convincing evidence. State v. Schulz, 221 Neb. 473, 378
N.W.2d 165 (1985).
243. State v. Wragge, 246 Neb. 864, 524 N.W.2d 54 (1994). See, also, State v. Painter, 223 Neb. 808, 394 N.W.2d
292 (1986)(the revocation court is to impose a new sentence for the crime of which the defendant was originally
convicted).
244. State v. Jacobson, 221 Neb. 639, 379 N.W.2d 772 (1986).
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245. State v. Wayt, 13 Neb. App. 759, 701 N.W.2d 841 (2005).
246. 272 Neb. 662, 724 N.W.2d 316 (2006).
247. Id., at 668, 724 N.W.2d at 320.
248. State v. Schulz, 221 Neb. 473, 378 N.W.2d 165 (1985); see, also, State v. Tweedy, 1995 Neb. App. LEXIS 111
(Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 1995)(not designated for permanent publication).
249. State v. Wayt, 13 Neb. App. 759, 701 N.W.2d 841 (2005).
250. The legislature has added useful language to many of its driver’s license sanctions statutes. That language, as it
appears in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-905 (Lexis 2007), operating a motor vehicle in an effort to avoid arrest or citation,
follows this pattern: “ An order of the court under this section prohibiting operation of a vehicle or vessel and
revoking the operator's license shall be administered upon sentencing, upon final judgment of any appeal or review,
or upon the date that any probation is revoked, whichever is later.”
Court ordered driver's license sanctions appear in a wide variety of the straight sentences applicable to a
number of offenses. Examples include (there are more lurking in the statutes): driving under the influence of
alcohol or drugs and refusal to submit to chemical test, Neb. Rev. Stat. § § 60-6,197.03 (Lexis 2007); willful
reckless driving; first offense, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,216 (Lexis 2007); and, a catch-all provision relating to
offenses committed in such manner as to endanger life, limb or property, which is certainly applicable to 1st offense
reckless driving, but its scope is not easily determinable, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-496 (Lexis 2007).
251. 221 Neb. at 478, 378 N.W.2d at 169. What constituted the date of conviction, whether it is the date an
offender's plea of guilty or no contest is accepted, the date a verdict of guilty is rendered (in contested cases), or the
date of the first sentence to be imposed (a probation sentence is a judgment of conviction) presents an interesting
question essentially outside the scope of this article. The alternative that creates the fewest administrative problems
is the date the first sentence is imposed. However, at least once, the supreme court has held that the date the plea of
guilty or no contest is accepted is the date of conviction for purposes of the allowable period of driver's license
sanctions. State v. McKain, 230 Neb. 817, 434 N.W.2d 10 (1989).
In order to allow for the consideration of presentence investigations where it is desirable to do so, in cases in
which license sanctions are a part of the penalties, trial courts would be forced, under McKain, to decline acceptance
of the pleas until the date set for sentencing. Otherwise, the license sanctions will have to be imposed separately
from the rest of the sentences (a strange and likely invalid approach). License sanctions generally are to be made a
part of the judgment of conviction. The alternative is to sentence without the benefit of presentence investigations,
which reduces the ability to individualize sentences. In Schulz, the court used the date of the judgment of conviction
(the date of the probation sentence) in determining the allowable period of license revocation because the record
presented to the supreme court did not reveal the date the defendant's plea was accepted.
LB 377 (1988) rendered the McKain holding inapplicable to cases arising under former §§ 39-669.07 & 39-
669.08, now §§ 60-6,196 & 60-6,196 after the effective date of LB 377. However, there were some probation
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sentences predating LB 377 that could have become revocation cases to which McKain would have applied as well
as potentially a few such cases may have remained pending on appeal. There also could have been some driving
under suspension or revocation cases that could have been affected due to invalid revocations and suspensions
imposed under the pre-McKain understanding and before LB 377.
Finally, if the statute providing for license sanctions, including the statutes involved in Schulz and McKain,
requires that the sanctions be imposed as part of the judgment of conviction, the logic of Schulz and McKain applies
to those license sanction sentences. Thus, in one sense, Schulz and McKain have limited direct applicability, but
they could lead indirectly to considerable mischief in a number of cases if the supreme court decided to adhere to the
McKain date of conviction rule in this context.
Over the years, depending upon the purposes for which the definition might apply, the Nebraska Supreme Court
has adopted several definitions of conviction:
1). For purposes of impeachment by proof of a prior conviction, entry of a guilty plea does not ripen into a
conviction until sentence is imposed (the judgment of conviction). Ford v. State, 106 Neb. 439, 184 N.W.
70 (1921); & Marion v. State, 16 Neb. 349, 20 N.W. 289 (1884).
2). For purposes of a constitutional provision declaring a public office vacant upon conviction of a felony,
the court said a guilty plea or verdict plus a sentence constitutes a conviction. State ex. rel. Hunter v.
Jurgensen, 135 Neb. 136, 280 N.W. 886 (1938).
3). For purposes of computing the time for the filing of a motion for new trial, the finding of guilt and the
imposition of sentence constitute a conviction. State v. Mosely, 194 Neb. 740, 235 N.W.2d 402 (1975).
4). A finding of guilty is a conviction, but it is not appealable until a judgment (sentence) is imposed. In re
Interest of Wolkow, 206 Neb. 512, 293 N.W.2d 851 (1980); & State v. Long, 205 Neb. 252, 286 N.W.2d
772 (1980).
In State v. Kramer, 231 Neb. 437, 439, 436 N.W.2d 524, 525-26 (1989), the supreme court ruled that its
Wolkow and Long holdings overruled by implication its definitions of conviction in Jurgensen and Mosely.
Thus, there is a distinction between a conviction and a judgment of conviction.
5). A plea of guilty or no contest, accepted and entered by the court, is a conviction or the equivalent of a
conviction, the effect of which is to authorize the imposition of sentence. Stewart v. Ress, 164 Neb. 876,
83 N.W.2d 901 (1957); & Taylor v. State, 159 Neb. 210, 66 N.W.2d 514 (1954). However, this line of
cases, relied upon in McKain, does not really define conviction, but is directed at the effects of the pleas of
guilty and no contest.
6). Finally, in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State, 86 Neb. 17, 124 N.W. 937 (1910), the court held that
the word "convicted" when used in a statutory phrase must refer to a determination of guilt in a criminal
proceeding. The court was deciding whether the liability imposed by the statute in question was intended
to be criminal or civil liability.
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252. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2268 (Lexis 2007).
253. Then codified as Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-669.07 & 39-669.08 (Reissue 1988), providing that the license
revocation shall be administered upon sentencing, upon final judgment after appeal, or upon the date of any
probation revocation.
254. LB 377 (1988) took effect on July 9, 1988.
255. See example statutes cited supra, n. 250.
256. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2277 to 29-2279 (Lexis 2007).
257. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2278 (Lexis 2007). Note: a specific, direct authorization of arrests for a specified type of
probation violation, but still no warrant issuance authority.
258. Presumably, the failure to perform would be a criminal contempt to be followed by a contempt sentence upon
an adjudication of guilt.
259. Who decides which remedy to pursue is an interesting question implicating matters of proper judicial role,
beyond the scope of this article.
260. At least on class III misdemeanors and above. See, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2279 (Lexis 2007).
261. In this sense, probation itself is an alternative sentence.
262. The prosecution should not be anxious to have to retry such matters due to procedural deficiencies.
263. The legislative history is silent on the type of hearing the legislature had in mind.
